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DOD 4TH ESTATE: IMPROVEMENTS AND EFFICIENCIES FOR 
THE SERVICES 
ABSTRACT 
This paper recommends how Defense Agencies and Field Activities (DAFA) 
should consolidate efforts and reconfigure itself to better align its own missions with 
those of its customers and save the DOD money to spend on other projects. The DOD 
should also look to cut the DAFA budgets from a bottom-up approach and not a 
percentage slice across the top of all agencies. DAFA could implement eight measures to 
improve efficiencies, with or without budget cuts: 
• Agency—Facilities Mergers & Formations
• Agency and Facilities Closures





• Contingency Response Force
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have also caused exploration of how the 
federal government must rethink the work environment. The DOD must invest more 
resources in information technology and allow commands the flexibility to accomplish 
their missions, as disruptive events will continue to occur in the future. Integrated DOD 
systems and in-house resourcing will be key to creating a new environment that provides 
for pandemic precautions and yet is nimble enough to continue the mission. Our research 
supports the idea that the mission can now sometimes be accomplished by means other 
than travel. The data shows that the DOD could reduce its physical footprint by moving 
toward needs-based congregation, personnel, and facility sharing. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Defense Agencies and Field Activities (DAFA), also known as the Fourth 
Estate, must evolve into a more valuable asset to the military services by making changes 
that are more beneficial to its customers. Some DAFA agencies should lean forward with 
further integration into their military customers by better aligning their mission outcomes 
and expanding services. Other agencies should be merged together, down-scoped, or closed 
in order to privatize less efficient services. And finally, some new agencies should be 
established in order to harness and synthesize the administrative actions that the military 
components are performing individually. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the need for alternative work arrangements 
and created the opportunity to change and demonstrated that work previously done in 
proximity to work activities, such as at contractor facilities or headquarters in the 
Washington DC, area can be transferred to virtual pools throughout the Department of 
Defense (DOD), optimizing the already-in-place civilian workforce, before contracting for 
outside services. DAFA must find new ways to meet customer needs and hone and promote 
these new services without sacrificing existing capabilities. This paper gives several 
recommendations that the Fourth Estate should implement to consolidate efforts and 
support the military mission. Eight action items should be implemented: 
1. Agency—Facilities Mergers and Formations 
2. Agency and Facilities Closures 
3. Agency Mission Expansions 
4. Service Expansions 
5. Service Privatization 
6. Service Enhancements 
7. IT Enhancements 
8. Establishment of Contingency Response Force 
xvi 
By taking these actions, the DOD will be able to comply with the Government 
Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) recommendations, which state that “military departments 
generally have not developed plans to use the inventory for workforce and budget 
decisions, as statutorily required. This is consistent with what the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found and reported on in November 2014 and October 2016. 
GAO’s analysis found that the military departments’ guidance generally does not require 
using the inventory in workforce and budget decisions” (DiNapoli, 2018, p. 2).  
Service Taxonomy is broken down into eight portfolio groups (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, 2012): 
Knowledge-Based Services 
• Engineering Management Services 
• Program Management Services 
• Logistics Management Services 
• Management Support Services 
• Administrative & Other Services 
• Professional Services 
• Education & Training 
Equipment-Related Services 
• Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul 
• Equipment Modification 
• Installation of Equipment 
• Quality Control 
• Technical Representative Services 
• Purchases & Leases 
• Salvage Services 
Facility-Related Services 
• Architect/Engineering Services 
• Operation of Government Owned Facilities 
• Machinery & Equipment Maintenance 
• Building & Plant Maintenance 
• Natural Resource Management 
• Utilities 
• Housekeeping & Social Services 
• Purchases & Leases 
xvii 
Medical Services 
• General Medical Services 
• Dentistry Services 
• Specialty Medical Services 
Transportation Services 
• Transportation of Things 
• Transportation of People 
• Other Travel & Relocation Services 
Electronics and Communications Services 
• ADP Services 
• Telecom Services 
• Equipment Maintenance 
• Equipment Leases 
Research and Development 
• Systems Development 
• Operational Systems Development 
• Technology Base 
• Commercialization 
• Advisory & Assistance 
Construction Services 
• Structures & Facilities 
• Conservation & Development Facilities 
• Restoration Activities 
Within the eight service portfolio groups, several are required to be included in 
military departmental submissions to Congress for intentional outside sourcing: logistics 
management services, equipment-related services, knowledge-based services, and 
electronics and communications services (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2012). 
We believe that by implementing the recommendations herein, DAFA could improve 
services to make inroads for better budget decision-making by pulling some of the work 
back into the DOD, leaving the more complicated work for procured services. The two 
areas of greatest interest are knowledge-based services and logistics management services. 
xviii 
Finally, if the DOD were to create a cadre of service managers who work to cut out 
the overhead that is baked into the procurement “pie” when contracting for outside 
services, the DOD will save billions of dollars in overhead in both the short and long run. 
This paper demonstrates that by building a pliable pool of ready federal employees and 
government wage earners, supervised by a cadre of service managers, the DOD, in a 
growing number of group portfolios of service areas, will steadily gain more competent 
employees, whether as wage earners or fully vetted General Schedule employees. This 
scenario will build assets and be cheaper than hiring companies that charge high overheads 




DiNapoli, T. (2018). DOD contracted services, long-standing issues remain about using 
inventory for management decisions (GAO-18-330). Government Accountability 
Office. 
Under Secretary of Defense, Defense Pricing (2012, August 27), Taxonomy for the 
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In 2020, the Department of Defense (DOD) was once again leaning on the Fourth 
Estate Agencies to find efficiencies (i.e., budget cuts) to make up funding shortfalls for 
priorities elsewhere in the department, such as research and development, more supplies, 
and increased pay for the warfighter. To deal with budget shortfalls, the DOD sometimes 
considers its federal civilian workforce, otherwise known as full-time equivalencies (FTE), 
as semi-disposable labor resources. We hypothesize throughout this research that a better 
approach should first take measures to optimize the capabilities, talents, and skills 
throughout the department and maximize their usage across agencies so as not to overuse 
and overspend on outside contracting services.  
Some of the full and continuous work and activities that many DOD civilian FTE 
could perform are quickly shifted to outside contracted services of private organizations. 
Research conducted by the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) states that, 
historically, the federal government wastes money by hiring outside services contractors 
(Chassy & Amey, 2011). It has been determined that service contractors come to 2.94 times 
more cost than the average federal defense employee performing similar functions (Amey, 
2012). The number of full time equivalents (FTE) in both workforces is basically the same; 
however, the salaries are very different: “DOD service contracts cost $253.8 billion and 
DOD’s civilian workforce costs $72 billion (base) or $108 billion (base plus overhead) in 
FY 2010” (Amey, 2012, para. 2). Other more recent articles confirm that the same trend 
continues. As late as 2018, the online magazine Government Executive noted that outside 
contractors cost 316% more than their civilian counterparts. This means that taxpayers’ 
dollars are being overspent by as much as 316% in some cases (Katz, 2018). 
Plenty of reasons necessitate contracting outside services, such as the skills to 
perform the task not residing in the DOD at the place where they are needed, operations 
and maintenance (O&M) budget concerns, the need to meet the small business contracting 
goals mandated by Congress, and more complex requirements. But more often than not, 
the reason to hire outside services is because some specialties are required only for a certain 
project or time period (agility in the start and stop of the work activity) and the skills needed 
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are very specific. Certain skills are so precise that the employee could not be adequately 
compensated by normal compensation systems, even by the top bandwidth and step of the 
general schedule (GS), or any other compensation schedule, for payment purposes. If the 
highest skilled workers could be compensated, then those personnel would be, with in a 
matter of time, undercompensated and ultimately leaving government service, thereby 
creating another gap that would have to be filled with less qualified individuals or outside 
contractors. So, the need and gap cycle become perpetual. 
The other costs and problems not captured in the POGO study were processes 
unique to service acquisition. Service contracts differ from materials contracts because 
services are intangible. Each service performed is unique to that customer or service 
provider and is therefore difficult to replicate over a wide spectrum of customers. 
Evaluations of performance are usually subjective. The three phases of service 
acquisition—plan, develop, and execute—with its 15 steps can take twice as long to 
procure the service and more than twice the amount in the internal costs to work the 
contract actions. The government is paying government employees to take all the steps to 
procure outside services and then to monitor performance. There are some cases in which 
it would save the DOD money to retain a trained, prepared, and mobile contingency of 
federal employees ready to supplant these contracted services. 
There is another reason that the DOD outsources professional services: political 
optics. Congress is more willing to cut the federal civilian workforce deeper and faster than 
military personnel. Outside service procurements cover the bases and do not carry the same 
political baggage. It makes for better press at home. If military personnel are cut, then it 
stands to political reasoning that the DOD civilian workforce should be cut as well. 
However, even when a direct military threat has been removed and military personnel cut, 
the preparation for the next threat does not diminish. The work done at program offices, 
contracting shops, contractor facilities, research and development laboratories, and 
government-owned organizations must still continue. Contracting, cost analysis, auditing, 
intelligence gathering, and thousands of other activities simultaneously remain at the same 
or even increasing levels. Someone must still perform the work, but what is sometimes 
characterized as a “bloated” civilian workforce is not what Congress wants to have in a 
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time of budget cuts. The work is therefore shifted to procurement funding, which can be a 
lot more costly, but politically safer.  
Unfortunately, outside of its procurement programs, the DOD manages only to 
budget, and not to cost. Defense activities and field activities are budgeted by Congress a 
certain amount for O&M, inside of which the dollar amount of the FTE occupation count 
is also appropriated. Each agency is expected to meet its FTE quota—not exceed, and not 
undershoot. Congress dictates the agency’s FTE count, as well as funding, thereby severing 
any chance for the agency to demonstrate savings and efficiencies, or configure its staffing 
in a manner that it sees fit. Using the numbers from the Inventory of Contracted Services 
(ICS) on the DPAP website, if only 10% of the $190 billion allocated in 2019 to procuring 
outside services were reallocated to DAFA O&M funding, and then DAFA directors were 
tasked to show savings of 15%, that could be translated into a $2.8 billion savings, if they 
were also held to managing to cost and not just overall budget (DPAP, 2021). 
This paper demonstrates ways that the DOD could maximize the use of its existing 
workforce before turning to contracted services. Other recommendations include agency 
mergers in which two or more agencies that are already working in tandem, or have 
overlapping activities, could create synergies and efficiencies, if their employees had 
access to each other’s systems and delegation bureaucracy were eliminated. The DOD 
should create an overarching Human Resources agency that will facilitate such fluidity 
within the whole department, not just within its separate agencies. There is also a multitude 
of services that the Fourth Estate could perform that, if given the authority, could be 
expanded and assist the military services. On the other hand, there are other agencies, such 
as the Defense Commissary Agency, that should be downsized to an office that manages 
the private entity that would run all of the DOD’s commissaries and exchanges. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has further demonstrated that some work that was 
formerly performed in brick-and-mortar offices can be done just as efficiently from remote 
locations, if resources and recommendations from this paper are implemented. Therefore, 
many facilities that the DOD owns or rents could be sold or let the lease expire. Before 
cutting a highly skilled federal workforce out of the equation, ones with all the knowledge 
that has been accumulated over the years, the secretary of defense should seriously look at 
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creating a cadre of service managers and increase the number of individually hired wage 
earners (WG) to be converted into civilian FTEs (GS) in order to use procurement funds 
more prudently for contracting outside services. 
The purpose of the thesis is to recommend eight different approaches to cutting the 
budgets of the DAFA, instead of making a top line slice across all agencies and contracting 
for more outside services, which simply shift expenditures from O&M to Procurement 
dollars.  
1. Agency—Facilities Mergers & Formations 
2. Agency and Facilities Closures 
3. Agency Mission Expansions 
4. Service Expansions 
5. Service Privatization 
6. Service Enhancements 
7. IT Enhancements 
8. Establishment of Contingency Response Force 
The value of some DAFA agencies to the effectiveness of the military services is 
greater than others and, therefore, should be taken under consideration, along with their 
unique abilities to create value and efficiencies by making changes in hiring and working 
arrangements. We came to our conclusions through interactions with subject matter experts 
to include both DAFA employees and military services members.  
Follow ups with senior military and Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel gave 
us insight to wider picture of direct implementations that will have decisive effects on how 
the DOD approaches personnel and real estate management. The research also included 
and was supported by GAO reports, commissioned reports by the DOD, and literature 
reviews of published works in the field of Government and Public Policy. 
In Chapter II we begin our research and recommendations with the business 
improvements that should be made, which covers the first seven of the eight recommended 
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approaches to cut the budgets of the DAFA. These recommendations will, if implemented 
in a timely manner, produce dividends both immediately and in the long run. Then Chapter 
III covers the emergency the Contingency Response Force. This section will explore the 
need to rapidly deploy some DAFA personnel in response to an array of worldwide 
contingencies to augment the military services beyond what is currently offered. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall have the 
power “to raise and support Armies” and “to provide and maintain a Navy.” Nowhere in 
the Constitution is it stated that department-wide agencies should exist; therefore, it is 
incumbent upon the defense secretary to monitor the needs of the military services and 
ensure that the Fourth Estate is adequately providing for them.  
Meaningful long-lasting reform attempts of the Fourth Estate are difficult in that 
DOD senior leadership and political appointees rotate every 2–4 years on average (OPM, 
2017). Shorter time in assignments for senior leaders often make it more difficult  to 
develop strategic plans and, thus, they tend to focus more on smaller, tactical reforms. In 
the past the procurement of weapons systems and the training of the warfighter is more an 
immediate concern than the support that makes them materialize and function. The Fourth 
Estate is basically a system of support functions including contracting, human resources 
management, and accounting systems. These functions have historically been considered 
less prestigious and received comparatively less management attention (Candreva, 2017).  
In 1996, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) became the premier study by the 
DOD to analyze possible military threats and strategic objectives (Department of Defense, 
2018). This report, issued every 4 years since its inception, now coincides with the 
publication of the successive year’s budget request. “The congressionally mandated 
Quadrennial QDR directs the DOD to undertake a wide-ranging review of strategy, 
programs, and resources” (Defense, 2018, para. 2). Most important to this thesis is that it 
explores new approaches to addressing the most pressing near and long-term challenges. 
Specifically, the QDR is anticipated to define a defense strategy congruent with the most 
current National Security Strategy by defining “force structure, modernization plans, and 
6 
a budget plan” (Mehta, 2021, para. 9). In 2018, the QDR was changed to the National 
Defense Strategy (Mehta, 2021). 
While several attempts at addressing the requirements of the QDR over the years 
were found insufficient, the DOD formally established the position of Deputy Chief 
Management Office (DCMO) by a directive in October of 2008. The Officer of CMO 
(OCMO) is responsible for coordinating defense management operations, ensuring the 
most favorable arrangement in the sustainment of DOD’s mission. Furthermore, the 
directive entrusted the OCMO with specific functions in strategic planning, capability 
management, process refinement, and defense business surveillance oversight (Mehta, 
2021).  
The 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) eliminated the CMO 
position immediately and breaks up the OCMO in 2021. With this change, its responsibility 
moved to the deputy secretary of defense, giving the “deputy secretary of defense the 
authority to significantly improve the transformation of the DOD’s business operations and 
processes over the status-quo that never fulfilled the statutory requirements of the position” 
(Mehta, 2021, para. 9). Although the OCMO no longer exists, the Fourth Estate must 
continually show relevancy and find efficiencies to meet the demands of the military 
services who need more bang for their buck every year. Since the 1960s the military has 
converted more and more jobs that were once performed by uniformed personnel to federal 
civilian employees and contractors, both called full-time equivalents (FTE) (Eisler et al., 
2018). The Institute for Defense Analyses calls this the civilianization of noncombatant 
work in the DOD in order to remilitarize the military (Eisler et al., 2018). 
“In 2019, Defense Secretary Mark Esper directed Pentagon officials to scrutinize 
Fourth Estate spending to put money toward technology development and other priorities. 
In January 2020, he announced that he had found $5.7 billion to shift” (Peniston, 2020, 
para. 5). These types of cuts or budget flattening will continue, if the DOD hiring and 
retainment strategy does not change. 
Table 1 encompasses a list of the Fourth Estate agencies. 
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Table 1. List of Fourth Estate Agencies 
Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA) 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) 
DOD Dependents Education Agency (DODEA) 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
Defense Health Agency (DHA) 
Defense Human Resources Activity (DHRA) [Field Activity] 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA) 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
Defense Media Activity (DMA) [Field Activity] 
Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
Defense Technical Information Center [Field Activity] (DTIC) 
Defense Technology Security Administration [Field Activity] (DTSA) 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) 
Office of Economic Adjustment [Field Activity] (OEA) 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) 
Space Development Agency (SDA) 
The Joint Staff (TJS or Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
Washington Headquarters Services [Field Activity] (WHS) 
 
B. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To answer the research question of how to improve Fourth Estate value, we 
employed an exploratory, qualitative research approach, incorporating a review of relevant 
reports, such as from the GAO and other government literature. We also contacted  
numerous stakeholders and subject matter experts, and analyzed data on service contracts, 
8 
internal processes, and budgets. The goal of this review is to explore different methods by 
which the DOD could improve Fourth Estate agency value and make recommendations in 
compliance with current statutes, regulations, and policies. Each recommendation is 
described without controlling any variables. 
Our research hypothesizes that there is more space in which the Fourth Estate can 
work for the military services before turning to outside contracted services, which alludes 
to the appearance that the DOD is “doing more with less.” The problem of Fourth Estate 
efficiency has been touched upon in many articles and GAO reports, but not in depth that 
we have brought here. The economics of our recommendations aim to prove that improving 
business functions and maximizing current assets, with few exceptions, is a better 
alternative to cutting government FTEs and outsourcing.  
We are using agency theory, in broad terms, as the relationship between two parties 
in which one, the Fourth Estate agencies, represents the other, the DOD, in day-to-day 
transactions that are not performed by the military services. The DOD created the Fourth 
Estate agencies to perform consolidated, centralized services on behalf of all military 
services. The Secretary of Defense delegates decision-making authority to the agencies. 
But because of mission misalignments, changing environments, and funding constraints, 
many budgetary decisions made in the past no longer make sense to maintain, such as top 
line budget cuts. The ultimate effect is that the principal looks to the agencies O&M sooner 
than other funds to make efficiency decisions, mainly in the form of budget cuts. Mission 
alignment should be an ongoing conversation between principal and agencies year after 
year so they can then budget and make civilian FTE alignment shifts between agencies and 
to the services accommodate those changes. Risk should be a long-term management 
responsibility and not set on short-sighted budget goals in that the principal may believe 
that it is incurring little or no risk by the decisions to cut the agencies’ services. We believe 
that the short game will ultimately come back to hurt the principal if the agencies are not 
used to their fullest extent. 
Our approach is to give a full complement of tools to find ways to save money and 
find efficiencies within the department. This differs from other theses and reports in which 
a singular notion for savings and efficiencies is given or, in the case of GAO reports, no 
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clear standard is given for the department to follow (DiNapoli, 2017). An example is the 
case of GAO-17-17, DOD Inventory of Contracted Services, in which it’s reported that the 
DOD did, indeed, generate the Inventory of Contracted Services, but did not use it for 
budgeting purposes. However, the GAO gives no clear standard to follow on how the DOD 
should use the ICS to make decisions and what goal should be met (DiNapoli, 2016). This 
paper builds on recommendations from the GAO, RAND, and other investigators of this 
subject.  
C. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  
The objective is to give the DOD recommendations on how to achieve some of the 
enterprise-wide reform saving targets gather from the ICS totaling $46 billion over 
FY2019-FY2024 (DPC, 2021). Our recommendations will focus on maximizing the use of 
DOD FTEs, especially in the Fourth Estate; improving business functions through a series 
of changes in internal DOD services; and addressing institutional resistance to cultural 
change. This report gives a comprehensive set of recommendations with supporting 
reasons. We also provide recommendations on how the DOD can improve preparation and 
put itself on a better footing for future emergency situations, such as COVID-19. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of the literature review is to identify other literary works that have 
examined the opportunities, advantages, and disadvantages to changing the use of Fourth 
Estate, or the DAFAs before utilizing contracted services. In pursuing this question, it is 
necessary to understand how the military, civilians, and contractors are determined to carry 
out mission and relevant risks. A review of Department of Defense Instructions (DODIs), 
GAO, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and RAND reports, and the DOD Inventory 
of Contracted Services in the DOD and other government documents revealed that there 
are still procedural gaps in determining whether military personnel, government 
employees, or contractors should be utilized.  
Congress and DOD officials set the numbers and end strength workforce mix of 
uniformed military and civilians through a top-down approach (Eisler et al., 2018). A 
bottom-up approach may be a better approach for efficient workforce management as 
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identification of mission, tasks, and functions provide total workforce requirements. 
Reviewing the mission and task will identify if the tasks are inherently governmental 
activity. After the strength of the military for operational readiness is assessed, government 
civilian numbers are calculated, and then remaining tasks can be filled by contractor service 
contracts. The IDA wrote a report for the DOD called “Managing the Total Force: Using 
Civilianization to Militarize the Military,” in which they identified ten recommendations 
on how the level of military and civilian workforce mix would be determined (Eisler et al., 
2018, pp. v-vi): 
1. Avoid implementing arbitrary cuts in the civilian workforce. DOD cannot 
prevent the Congress from imposing personnel caps and conversion bans, 
but it can make clear that such actions are serious impediments to rational 
workforce management.  
2. Tie end-strength increases to operational force structure requirements and 
accepted military essentiality arguments, while recognizing the intrinsic 
role of civilians as a part of operation capabilities. 
3. Develop a more aligned and enterprise-wide taxonomy for documenting 
mission, task, functions, and workload requirements without regard to the 
eventual labor source.  
4. Establish a governance process within the construct of DOD’s Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting Execution (PPBE) process and readiness 
reporting that facilitates a more consistent application of military 
essentiality, ensuring that demands for military manpower are 
coordinated and the military incumbency is warranted, informed by 
mission, task, function analysis, and/or a business case. . 
5. Ensure funding for civilian positions resulting from military-to-civilian 
conversions for a determined period of time. 
6. Ensure there are no gaps in funding during military-to-civilian 
conversions. 
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7. Consider integrating the funding of military and civilian personnel to 
improve visibility into the costs of alternative personnel types. Pilot 
programs could test ways of implementing decentralized military 
manpower budgeting.  
8. Standardize the reporting and coding criteria in future revisions of DODI 
1100.22 for manpower analysts across the Services and at the lowest 
organizational level possible. 
9. Adapt manpower systems to ensure the IG/CA report includes the criteria 
for military essentiality as identified in DODI 1100.22. (Eisler et al., 
2018, pp. v-vi) 
9. In their analysis, the researchers provided a ratio of 1:1.25, or only four 
civilians are required to replace every five military billets. The researchers 
determined a 1:1.25 rate would provide 31% of estimated savings to the 
government in personnel costs. (Eisler et al., 2018) 
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2017 was amended for 
the collection of inventory data for contracts over $3 million; it condensed the types of 
services included therein and requires the DOD to report on a plan on how to collect the 
data of FY2016 and how the data would be used for workforce planning, workforce mix, 
and budget decisions (DiNapoli, 2018). GAO-18-330 report to Congress verified that the 
DOD collected sufficient data for FY2016 to create the inventory summary, which OSD 
rendered to Congress in February 2018 (DiNapoli, 2018). However, the GAO report 
surmised that the “military departments had not developed plans to use the inventory for 
the workforce and budget decisions as statutorily required” (Eisler et al., 2018, P. 6 &7). 
DOD Manpower & Budget officials within the service stated the inventory data was too 
old for decision-making. At the service level, a timely inventory report would be useful to 
estimate the average number of contracted FTEs for the annual DOD budget (Eisler et al., 
2018).  
DPAP-Services Acquisition DOD Instruction issued in January 2016 required the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to establish three important leadership positions 
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identified as Functional Domain Experts (FDE), Component Level Leads (CLL), and 
Senior Service Manager (SSM) to strategically manage and oversee contracted services 
(DiNapoli, 2017). FDE responsibility for service acquisition includes forecasting, 
budgeting, strategic management, and oversight. CLL support the FDE and lead 
component-level strategic management of services within their portfolios. SSM were 
acquisition senior officials appointed within each of the three military departments. GAO 
report 17–482 stated, “We found that FDEs and CLLs have not been effective in improving 
DOD’s ability to strategically manage service acquisitions” (DiNapoli, 2016, p. 14). It was 
acknowledged by the DPAP-SA officials that FDEs were assigned these additional 
responsibilities, such as predicting manpower and budgeting needs and creating policies to 
priority requirements that were not within their line of control. “GAO also found the CLLs 
were not actively engaged in strategic management of services portfolios required by the 
instruction” (DiNapoli, 2017, p. 2). This identifies a continued gap in roles, responsibilities, 
and authorities’ need to strategically manage and oversee contracted services for the DOD.  
“The 2016 instruction also required Services Requirement Review Boards (SRRB) 
to be conducted within each military department to ensure the requirements are review, 
validated and approved” (DiNapoli, 2017, p. 6). The SRRB was responsible for 
determining if the requirement should be performed by a service contract or government 
civilians. GAO reviewed Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) 
data for FY2016 calculating the obligation for military department’s by service portfolio 
(DiNapoli, 2017). The instruction required the SRRB “to validate, prioritize, and approve 
service requirements from a holistic viewpoint” within and across portfolios (DiNapoli, 
2017). The GAO report17-482 stated: 
We found, however, that the three military commands we reviewed did not 
implement SRRBs that approved service requirement from a holistic 
perspective, but instead leveraged their existing contract review boards, 
which focus their efforts on assuring proposed contract solicitations and 
award are in compliance with federal acquisition regulations and DOD 
guidance. As a result, the SRRB had minimal effect on supporting trade-off 
decision in the service portfolios or assessing opportunities for efficiencies 
and eliminating duplicate requirements. (DiNapoli, 2017, p. 22) 
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The civilian component includes “U.S. citizens and foreign nationals on the DOD’s 
direct payroll, as well as foreign nationals hired indirectly through contractual arrangement 
with overseas host nations. This category does not include those paid through non-
appropriated fund (NAF) activities” (Office of the Under Secretary for Personnel and 
Readiness, 2019, p. vi). Table 2 shows that civilian manpower increases by 3.05% in 
FY2019 over FY2018, but less than 1% in FY2020 over FY2019.  
Table 2. Civilian Manpower by Service (thousands) 
 FY18 Actuals FY19 Estimate FY20 Estimate 
Army 189.1 197.0 194.9 
Navy 187.5 192.7 195.5 
Marine Corp 21.2 21.3 21.7 
Air Force 169.9 176.5 179.3 
Defense-wide 178.7 181.7 183.1 
Total DOD 746.4 769.2 774.5 
Defense Manpower Requirements Report FY20. Source: Office of the Under Secretary 
for Personnel and Readiness (2019, p. 2 & 3). 
 
DOD Instruction 1100.22 provides the Policy and Procedures for Determining 
Workforce Mix. The instruction “provides manpower mix criteria and guidance for risk 
assessments to be used to identify and justify activities that are Inherently Governmental 
(IG) or Commercial Activities (CA)” (DOD, 2010, p. 1). Risk mitigation is much more 
important than cost savings according to the DOD policy (DOD, 2010).  
“Functions that are not IG are commercial in nature. CAs that are exempted from 
private sector performance by law, executive order (E.O.), treaty, or international 
agreement (IA) shall be designated for DOD civilian or military performance” (DOD, 
2010, p. 15). The instructions states “that if a function is not IG or exempt from private 
sector performance, DOD components shall use DOD civilian personnel, unless the civilian 
workforce is not the lowest cost or there is a legal, regulatory, or procedural impediment 
to using public-private competition” (DOD, 2010).  
The 2016 DOD Inherently Governmental (IG) and Commercial Activities (CA) 
Inventory Report of March 2016 provides DOD Federal Activities Inventory Reform 
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(FAIR) Act Inventory from DOD Service Contract Reporting activity for Fiscal Year 2015   
(Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2016). The FAIR Inventory categorizes 
civilian authorizations as commercial activities or inherently governmental. Table 3 
provides a summary of the 2015 DOD IG/CA inventory and shows each department 
percentage of IG of the total FAIR CA and IG combined. We summarized the data to 
identify the Fourth Estate separate agencies and a subtotal for services.  
We analyzed the DOD Commercial Activities and those that are Inherently 
Governmental by each Defense Agency. Table 3 indicates that DAFA has 51,819 positions 
that are conducting service type positions that are non-inherently governmental positions. 
The Services have 424,191 positions covering non-inherently government positions. 
DAFA makes up 12.2% of the total services positions. Reviewing the inherently 
governmental positions, DAFA provides 50,876 of the 239,994 or over 21% of the 
Inherently Governmental positions. Table 3 outlines the 2015 ICS by entity. 
Table 3. Fourth Estate - DOD Services Contract Inventory. Source: OMB 
(2016). 
 
DARPA 2                 -                           2                 180             17                          197             182            17                          199             98.90%
DAU 95               71                            166             656             45                          701             751            116                        867             87.35%
DeCA 11,158        -                           11,158        1,690          4                            1,694          12,848       4                            12,852        13.15%
DCAA 539             1,852                       2,391          4,591          -                         4,591          5,130         1,852                     6,982          89.49%
DCMA 1,017          206                          1,223          11,739        767                        12,506        12,756       973                        13,729        92.03%
DoDEA 12,004        -                           12,004        161             -                         161             12,165       -                         12,165        1.32%
TMA 20               -                           20               2,584          45                          2,629          2,604         45                          2,649          99.23%
DoDHRA 736             2                              738             437             7                            444             1,173         9                            1,182          37.25%
DFAS 10,353        21                            10,374        735             -                         735             11,088       21                          11,109        6.63%
DISA 461             883                          1,344          5,598          1,718                     7,316          6,059         2,601                     8,660          92.39%
DLA 13,319        1,384                       14,703        11,712        1,233                     12,945        25,031       2,617                     27,648        46.79%
DMA 546             -                           546             127             932                        1,059          673            932                        1,605          18.87%
DPMO 49               45                            94               29                          29               49              74                          123             0.00%
DSCA 12               12                            24               427             95                          522             439            107                        546             97.27%
DTIC 189             -                           189             93               -                         93               282            -                         282             32.98%
DTRA 481             10,740                     11,221        572             641                        1,213          1,053         11,381                   12,434        54.32%
DTSA -                           138             115                        253             138            115                        253             100.00%
JS 45               2,222                       2,267          1,352          1,996                     3,348          1,397         4,218                     5,615          96.78%
MDA 178             -                           178             2,403          246                        2,649          2,581         246                        2,827          93.10%
NDU 9,712                       9,712          493             187                        680             493            9,899                     10,392        100.00%
OSD 68               -                           68               1,930          545                        2,475          1,998         545                        2,543          96.60%
DLSA 253                          253             148             1                            149             148            254                        402             100.00%
PFPA -                           1,261          14                          1,275          1,261         14                          1,275          100.00%
TRMC -                           31               3                            34               31              3                            34               100.00%
WHS 547             -                           547             1,786          160                        1,946          2,333         160                        2,493          76.55%
OEA -                           32               -                         32               32              -                         32               100.00%
4th Estate 51,819       27,403                    79,222       50,876       8,800                    59,676       102,695   36,203                  138,898    49.54%
Services 372,372    601,506                 973,878    189,119    1,411,901            1,601,020 561,491   2,013,407            2,574,898 33.68%
Grand Total 424,191    628,909                 1,053,100 239,995    1,420,701            1,660,696 664,186   2,049,610            2,713,796 36.13%
























The DOD Manpower and Budgeting officials are standardizing the budget review 
process to compel the Fourth Estate to apply the same review pressures the services face 
when developing their own budgets. Currently the military services formulate their budgets 
under the instructions within the National Security Strategy (Garamone, 2020). Military 
service leaders must make crucial decisions about how to prioritize their programs and 
required capabilities before they submit their budget to the Secretary of Defense for 
scrutiny (Garamone, 2020). Whereas, the Fourth Estate simply has a topline total they 
cannot be exceed and the DOD manpower weigh the priority and importance of each 
Fourth Estate Agency. “The agencies and activities in the Fourth Estate do not have the 
same pressures. They submit their budgets at the same time as the services, but miss the 
scrutiny that requires taking money from one program to fund one with a higher priority” 
(Garamone, 2020, para 14). In February 2020, the Secretary of Defense “signed a memo 
to place all the Fourth Estate agencies into one pot, and the chief management officer would 
examine the budgets as a whole, shifting funds where they are needed and eliminating 
duplicative or overtaken capabilities” (Garamone, 2020, para. 14). The CMO was able to 
save some costs; however, the CMO position was recently eliminated in the FY2021 
NDAA. The Under Secretary of Defense now has the responsibility for the budget for the 
Fourth Estate.  
In summary, the literature review revealed that risks are weighed when utilizing 
military, government, or civilian employees, or when outsourcing to a contractor. Many 
procedural gaps have been disclosed in how the government determines when civilians are 
utilized or a commercial company. We evaluate each of the opportunities to utilize Fourth 
Estate civilians before outsourcing to contractors and what other actions should be taken 
to create efficiencies. 
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II. RESEARCH DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Research was initially conducted by agency questionnaires requesting narratives as 
to what improvements the Fourth Estate could make to add value for its customers. 
Responses came from the military components and the fourth estate agencies and field 
activities. The  agencies that did respond, such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, DCMA, 
DCAA, DARPA, and DLA  gave a myriad of suggestions to improve DAFA’s value and 
establish a methodology or an order of steps to take that could save the DOD money both 
in the short term and in the long term as well. If the recommendation was feasible, the 
investigators determined the degree to which the recommendation would fit into the overall 
research. For example, the establishment of new agencies did not seem to be good fit in a 
theme to cut costs, but we found that consolidation of human resource functions under one 
newly restructured agency, and real estate functions under another, would, indeed, 
complement both value improvement and create efficiencies.  
It was also determined that there were not just two or three areas for improvement. 
Instead, our follow ups with agencies indicted that agencies had a full supplement of ideas. 
Thus, we concluded that just expanded services and merging / closing agencies, the normal 
procedures taken when cutting DAFA budgets, was enough to present in this report. We 
present here which what actions should be taken, why they are appropriate, and the 
problems that must be overcome in order to achieve the long term effect. 
The data collected pointed in the direction of seven improvements that should be 
made within the Fourth Estate before making a top-line budget cut over all the agencies: 
1. Agency-Facilities Mergers & Formations 
2. Agency and Facilities Closures 
3. Agency Mission Expansions 
4. Service Expansions 
5. Service Privatization 
6. Service Enhancements 
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7. IT Enhancements 
8. Establishment of Contingency Response Force 
A. BUSINESS PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS 
1. Agency and Facilities Mergers and Formations 
The founding of new agencies through merging agencies is key to successful 
consolidation of DAFA’s increase usefulness and value. The newly formed agencies and 
expansion of services will allow DAFA to concentrate on their prime missions and not 
concern themselves with some of the administrative functions that are performed by all 
DOD agencies. Consolidation creates economies of scale, larger pools of resources, and 
synergy to provide the military more of what is wanted from them. Why consolidation? 
Although each agency does share information with others as needed, there are times when 
agencies work in a space of “empire building” and information is not as free-flowing as it 
should be. This conclusion was drawn from our questionnaire and interviews.  
The unwillingness to share information is not a new problem. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) was established in March 2003, combining 22 separate agencies 
into one, Cabinet-level department to develop a singular security framework (DHS, 2021). 
Repositories of data and information are not open to other agencies that own missions that 
are similar to their own. Sharing the data between agencies is an option; however, there is 
a deep-seated reluctance between government agencies to actually completely share 
information, which impedes the DOD from accomplishing its overall mission effectively. 
Unsurprisingly, demands for greater information sharing have risen within the DOD. 
(DODIG, 2019) 
“Then, on the heels of a string of massive data breaches, [such as Solar Winds in 
2020], many began questioning if the pendulum swung too far towards sharing information 
at the expense of data privacy and data security” (Archer, 2015, para. 1). If these 
restrictions and artificial walls were torn down through mergers, then the bigger picture 
will open up to those that are a part of the new agency. Just like any business, the DOD 
hires 5–15% of the agency’s staff as Mission Support Operations (MSO) staff, mainly in 
the headquarters. If half of those MSO staff could be consolidated into more focused 
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agencies, the DOD overall would benefit. Based on our research,  we list the candidates for 
the establishment of completely new agencies and mergers between agencies that conduct 
similar enough functions that they could be merged in order to save on support staff and 
share information more readily in order to achieve the mission for the military departments. 
2. New Agency Candidate:  Defense Real Estate Agency (DREA) 
Problem: The DOD has no consolidated agency that buys, sell, develops, and 
manages the property that it owns, rents, or plans to occupy 
Research and recommendations: Currently all real estate efforts for the DOD are 
performed by GSA, the military services, Washington Headquarter Services, or DAFA. In 
a 2016 report (GAO-16-375SP) the following is claimed: 
GAO has designated the federal government’s management of its real 
property assets as high risk, in part because of overreliance on costly leasing 
and challenges in reducing excess infrastructure. 1 In particular, the 
Department of Defense (DOD)-one of the federal government’s largest 
owners of real estate-continues to rely on and pay for leased commercial 
space while also operating and maintaining underutilized (vacant or 
partially vacant) facilities on its military installations. DOD expends 
valuable resources on these underutilized facilities that could potentially be 
eliminated from the budget or allocated to other uses. The need to better 
utilize existing real property has been the focus of government-wide efforts 
since the President issued an executive order to promote the efficient and 
economical use of federal real property assets in 2004. On March 25, 2015, 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a memorandum to 
clarify the existing policy to dispose of excess properties and promote more 
efficient use of real property assets. (Draper, 2016, p.131) 
According to the report Best Practices for Real Property Management (Defense 
Business Board, n.d.), the DOD is one of the chief Real Property managers in the world, 
maintaining inventory in all 50 states, seven U.S. territories, and 42 foreign countries in 
excess of 3 billion square feet of owned and leased facilities valued at over $1 trillion while 
costing $30 billion annually for maintenance and upkeep. A new DAFA agency, to be 
called the Defense Real Estate Agency (DREA), should be created to consolidate all the 
DOD’s real estate and occupancy efforts to maximize efficiencies. Considering that during 
the current COVID-19 pandemic a high number of DOD personnel have been put on a full-
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time telework status, a newly formed DREA could work to sell off, buy cheaper, trade 
spaces, or renegotiate property rental agreements with GSA and commercial entities, 
saving the DOD billions of dollars. A centralized DOD real estate and property agency 
could more readily make acquisition and leasing decisions designed to shape strategic 
efforts and shrink the DOD’s overall facility footprint. Using a common departmental 
strategy and robust data acquisition systems, the DREA could continuously analyze 
occupancy costs and facility capacity to leverage economies of scale, minimize suboptimal 
usage, hire the best property managers, and lower costs.  
3. DCMA/DCAA 
Problem: The DCMA and DCAA perform many functions that overlap and 
systems that do not talk to each other. The military services rely on reports from both 
agencies. Some reports from each agency on the same assignment conflict each other, while 
others are not sent to the buying activity in a timely manner (Simmons, 2015). 
Research and recommendations: The DOD would gain a more structured 
approach to the cost and pricing of DOD contracts and the administration of those contracts 
if these two agencies were to become one. The number of functions and the actual work 
that each agency performs is shrinking as contract workloads decrease due to funding cuts. 
DCMA and DCAA work very closely together to achieve end results that affect the 
military’s ability to do business with private contractors. By combining their forces through 
a merger, the DOD will gain a force multiplier and reduce administration costs. The two 
agencies already have offices in geographical proximity to each other already since they 
both deal with the same contractors. Physically merging the two agencies will not be 
difficult, it will be the mental barriers that will be difficult to tear down. 
The DCMA is already committed to cutting salaries by $1.8 million and travel by 
$1 million in the FY2021 budget and beyond. This will be accomplished by leveraging 
technology and expanding telework (Soles & Williams, 2020). If the two agencies merged, 
then contract insight would be heightened, stronger focus on customer needs met, and 
personnel workload better configured since both agencies work on the financials of 
contracts and contractors. The auditing and contracting functions that are performed are 
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similar, but not always the same. Where they are the same or similar, a synergy could be 
developed and workload distribution across the newly merged agency would allow for 
either cuts, better utilization, or further expansion of service for the military on the pre-
award side of contracting. DCMA’s and DCAA’s staffing numbers and budgets from FY 
2018 and 19 are shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 1. DCMA and DCAA by the numbers. Source: Soles and 
Williamson (2020, p. 10). 
 
Figure 2. DCMA and DCAA President’s Budget. Source: Soles and 
Williamson (2020, p. 11). 
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4. NGA/NRO 
Problem: The National Geospatial Agency (NGA) and the National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) share similar missions that do not create an optimum 
amount of synergy as separate agencies. Overlapping missions and separated data 
repositories keep the two agencies from realizing their full potential in the life cycle of 
satellite development to intelligence gathering through those very same satellites. 
Research and recommendations: Both the NGA and NRO provide the DOD with 
intelligence from satellites and other telecommunication platforms and devices. The 
gathered information provides actionable intelligence to policy-makers, first responders, 
intelligence agencies, and warfighters; however, the two agencies’ intelligence offerings 
only vary slightly different from each other. (NGA, 2020) Both agencies take critical 
actions to help shape decisions that impact our nation and those of our allies through the 
gathering, analysis, and dissemination of geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) (NGA, 2020).  
Although the NGA’s website is fairly cryptic about “how” it accomplishes its 
mission, the official website does state that the NGA “enables the U.S. intelligence 
community and the Department of Defense (DOD) to fulfill the nation’s security priorities 
to protect the nation.” (NGA, 2020, para. 4). It’s well known that the NGA uses an 
extensive network of satellites to gather that intelligence and “maintain detailed, 
foundational physical characterizations of the Earth from seabed to space.” (NGA, 2020, 
para. 7) 
The NRO, contrarily, is the U.S. government agency “in charge of designing, 
building, launching, and maintaining America’s intelligence satellites. Whether creating 
the latest innovations in satellite technology, contracting with the most cost-efficient 
industrial supplier, conducting rigorous launch schedules, or providing the highest-quality 
products.” (NRO, 2020, para. 1) On the NRO website, one can notice that their mission 
includes “developing highly accurate military targeting data and bomb damage 
assessments and assessing the impact of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, 
floods, and fires” (NRO, 2020, para. 3).  
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The NRO and NGA have enough overlap in their missions that the demarcation of 
responsibilities between the two agencies remain ambiguous. If the NRO’s mission is 
“developing, building, and operating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
satellites” (Hitchens, 2019, para. 5), and the NGA’s mission is to use them as well, then 
they should be combined to build a synergy that will cut bureaucratic costs and assist both 
in their responsibilities (NRO, 2020). Before the NRO was created in 1961, the 
NGA had crystal clear authority in obtaining all commercial geospatial 
intelligence-related imagery and data to augment that provided by the 
NRO’s highly classified space systems and other data sources from other 
intelligence agencies. Now the waters are muddied, with the NGA retaining 
authority over acquisition of all other imagery sources and the responsibility 
to ensure that everything fits together, whereas the NRO holds the reins for 
buying commercial satellite imagery and creating a new military-
intelligence satellite imagery architecture. (Hitchens, 2019, para. 5) 
Again, there is enough in common between the two agencies’ missions that if they 
were combined, then the two components of the newly formed agency should be able to 
share the highly classified intelligence that is gathered by the agencies. The combined 
intelligence framework could benefit policy makers and Pentagon leadership with more 
useful and robust reporting that has more practical implications than what is happening 
with the agencies in their own separate silos. Intelligence is a commodity in politics and 
the military, and sometimes it’s guarded and distributed in ways that do not always fully 
benefit the consumer. If the barriers of competing intelligence agencies were torn down, 
then it is possible that the newly formed agency would have more resolution and map the 
way to better decisions. 
5. Space Development Agency / Missile Defense Agency 
Problem: The Space Development Agency (SDA) and the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) have similar missions that as separate agencies do not create an optimal amount of 
synergy to meet the DOD’s overarching mission and maintain two separate mission support 
teams. 
Research and recommendations: According to its official website, the SDA 
“orchestrates the development and fielding of DOD’s future threat-driven National 
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Defense Space Architecture. SDA uses novel approaches to accelerate the military space 
capabilities necessary to ensure U.S. technological and military advantage in space for 
national defense.” (SDA, 2020, para. 1) Since the SDA is developing next-generation space 
capabilities for our military, presumably Space Force (SF) would be one of its primary, if 
not only military customer. Why SF is not taking on these functions if there are no 
spacemen to train, drill, and deploy into space itself? The ability to deploy the military 
space capabilities (satellites and space stations) must ride on service of rockets or missiles. 
Since these projectiles are the lifeline to accomplish SDA’s mission, then just combine 
them with the agency that would be taking them into the domain of space, the Missile 
Defense Agency. 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) “is a research, development, and acquisition 
agency within the DOD. MDA develops, tests, and fields an integrated Missile Defense 
System (MDS) and works closely with the combatant commanders who rely on the system 
to defend the United States, U.S. forward deployed forces, and friends and allies from 
missile attack” (MDA, 2021, para. 1). 
The MDA develops guided self-propelled munitions, which are also called 
“missiles” powered by rocket engine, jet engine, or ramjet engine. Normally, one would 
think of a space agency such as NASA or SDA as having a need for the development of 
rockets; however, rockets are simply unguided self-propelled, rocket-powered munitions. 
Therefore, the continuation of developing missiles would serve the purposes of both 
missions in a newly formed agency. Combined forces would optimize available resources 
that now exist in separate and non-collaborating agencies to inspire professional excellence 
for both national defense and space exploitation. It may be even possible to merge NRO, 
NGA, SDA, and MDA into one large agency to create even more synergy. Fewer silos 
between agencies that have similar missions will gain incremental innovations, 
developments, and cooperation that is not possible as separate entities. 
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6. DSCA and DTRA 
Problem: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency (DTRA) share similar missions that do not create an optimum amount 
of synergy as separate agencies and, therefore, carry duplicate administrative costs.  
Research and recommendations: According to the official DSCA website, the 
agency’s mission statement is as follows: “To advance U.S. national security and foreign 
policy interests by building the capacity of foreign security forces to respond to shared 
challenges” (DSCA, 2021, para. 1). 
The DSCA ensures Secretary of Defense and USD(P) interests in security 
assistance matters are represented; identifies requirements, criteria, and 
procedures for the selection and training of personnel engaged in security 
assistance in DOD Security Cooperation (SC) programs over which DSCA 
has responsibility; communicates directly with the Heads of the DOD 
Components on SC matters over which DSCA has responsibility; in 
coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(A&S), as appropriate, supports 
the development of technology security and foreign disclosure and sales 
policies and procedures for defense information, technology, and systems; 
jointly establishes appropriate agreements and procedures with the Director, 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and with the Combatant Commands 
(CCMDs) for Senior Defense Officials (SDOs) and Defense Attachés 
(DATTs) to provide guidance and oversees security cooperation programs 
for which DSCA is responsible, in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations; approves, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Security Cooperation Organizations (SCO) joint manpower 
programs involving the establishment of new SCOs or changes in 
manpower authorizations or organizational structure; jointly, with the 
Director of the DIA, approves changes to the grade or Military Department 
affiliation of the SDO or DATT; reports to the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) in the Defense Readiness 
Reporting System (DRRS) readiness of personnel for SA activities in DOD 
SC programs over which DSCA has responsibility; and acts as the 
Executive Agent for DOD Regional Centers for Security Studies. 
Authorities conferred on the Secretary of Defense by the FAA and AECA 
pertaining to SA and authorities under those acts delegated by the President 
to the Secretary of Defense are re-delegated through the USD(P) to the 
Director, DSCA. (DSCA, 2021, para. 1) 
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The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) official website lays out seven 
distinct missions:  
1. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate prevents the proliferation 
or use of weapons of mass destruction by working with partner nations to 
secure, eliminate, detect, and interdict WMD-related systems and 
materials. 
2. Information Management & Technology Directorate projects the 
Agency’s knowledge and capabilities in order to combat the threat of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction and improvised threats and to ensure 
nuclear deterrence. 
3. Nuclear Enterprise Directorate provides capabilities that enable DOD 
warfighters, interagency stakeholders, allies, and partners to ensure a 
credible U.S. nuclear deterrent (DTRA, 2021). 
4. The On-Site Inspection and Building Capacity Directorate enables the 
DOD, the U.S. government, and international partners to counter and deter 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and Improvised Threat Networks by 
conducting Arms Control Treaty Verification and Countering Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (CWMD) Building Partner Capacity Activities. 
5. The Operations and Integration Directorate provides operational 
understanding and analytic support in order to coordinate, integrate, and 
synchronize agency Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) and 
their effects against National Defense Strategy (NDS) threats. 
6. The Research and Development Directorate provides science, technology, 
and capability development investments that maintain the U.S. military’s 
technological superiority in countering WMD and asymmetric threats, 
mitigate the risks of technical surprise, and respond to the warfighter’s 
urgent technical requirements. 
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7. The Strategic Integration Directorate shapes DTRA’s response to the 
challenges and priorities set forth in the National Defense Strategy, 
focusing the agency’s operations, activities, and investments in a manner 
that maximizes their cumulative effect in support of our warfighting 
customers. 
DTRA is the DOD agency that confronts WMD challenges and emerging 
threats. Its mission is to protect the United States and its allies by enabling 
the DOD and international partners to detect, deter, and defeat WMD and 
threat networks. As both a defense agency and combat support agency, 
DTRA preserves peace and prepares for uncertainty by delivering 
innovative capabilities, objective analysis, effective programs, and world-
class expertise. 
DTRA works with international partners and allies to mitigate the impact of 
WMD. These efforts include programs to train, exercise, engage, and build 
the capacity of partner nations. In particular, DTRA allied and partner 
engagements focus on risk reduction, nonproliferation, interdiction, border 
security, force protection, biosecurity, and consequence management. 
A core DTRA mission is its role in implementing the inspection, escort, and 
monitoring provisions of key arms control treaties and agreements. DTRA’s 
legacy of leading on-site inspection activities includes the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Open 
Skies, and New START. (DTRA, 2021, para. 1) 
Given that these two agencies have portions of their mission that overlap, 
combining them into one agency would provide for additional synergy, personnel cuts in 
management oversite, and an advanced service to the military branches. DSCA’s 
requirement and ability to build the capabilities of allied foreign security forces depends 
on analysis of our enemy’s capacity. If the analyses of emerging and real threats at DTRA 
as the environment changes were coalesced with DSCA’s mission to enable our allies’ 
capabilities to move on real time actionable information, then the DOD and our allies are 
better served. 
7. DTIC / DTSA  
Problem: Defense Technical Information Center’s (DTIC) and Defense 
Technology Security Administration (DTSA) share similar missions in identifying and 
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mitigating emerging threats as separate agencies and, therefore, carry duplicate 
administrative costs.  
Research and recommendations: The DTIC’s official website lays out how it 
“supports the USD(R&E)’s efforts to mitigate new and emerging threat capabilities, enable 
affordable or extended capabilities in existing military systems, and develop technology 
surprise through engineering by” (DTIC, 2021, para. 2): 
• Maintaining and distributing the research that led to [new] technologies. 
• Delivering the support to private industry to hasten the development of 
technologies. 
• Inspiring innovation in industry by giving access to DOD-funded 
developments. 
• Optimizing the value of defense dollars through the exploration of 
funding, work-in-progress, and Independent Research and Development 
(IRAD) information. (DTIC, 2021) 
The official website of the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) 
describes how the agency administers the  
development and implementation of DOD technology security policies on 
international transfers of defense-related goods, services, and 
technologies….The agency identifies and mitigates national security risks 
associated with the international transfer of controlled information and 
advanced technology in order to maintain the U.S. warfighter’s 
technological edge and support U.S. national security objectives. (DTSA, 
2021, paras. 1–2) 
Since these two agencies have missions that can work in tandem, not only could 
these two agencies be merged, but DARPA could have a third agency brought in to create 
a bigger think tank of collaborators. 
8. DAU/NDU  
Problem: The Defense Acquisition University and Nation Defense University, as 
stand-alone universities, do not pool their resources together in order to give the DOD a 
comprehensive set of programs that optimally benefit the department.  
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Research and recommendations: “The University Charter was created in October 
1991 by DOD Directive 5000.57. Originally a loose consortium of existing training 
commands, DAU worked to standardize the training courses and establish mechanisms that 
allowed for centralized management of training funds for the DOD workforce” (DAU, 
2021, para. 2). “In the late 1990s, the consortium arrangement was replaced by a centralized 
structure, more like that of a corporate university. By 2014, DAU had grown to the point 
of graduating 181,970 students” (DAU, 2021, para. 3). According DAU’s FY21 budget 
submittal at the DOD Comptroller’s DAU offers a platform on which “to develop qualified 
acquisition personnel, requirements, and contingency professionals who deliver and 
sustain effective and affordable warfighting capabilities” (OUSD, 2020, p. 3). 
The National Defense University (NDU), a DOD-funded university, facilitates 
“high-level training, education, and development of national security strategy” (NDU, 
2021, para. 1). Their mission is to educate “joint warfighters in critical thinking and the 
creative application of military power to inform national strategy and globally integrated 
operations, under conditions of disruptive change, in order to conduct war” (NDU, 2021, 
para. 1). 
The changes in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
certification in 2020 that reduce some training programs from 650 hours to 200 hours and 
will be fully implemented by October 2021 provides for an opportunity to review the 
missions of both universities to combine efforts to educate the DOD workforce as a whole 
and tailor certifications that could benefits from classes that are offered in one program, 
but not the other. Training in one university does not matriculate to the other and, therefore, 
credits from one university will not count toward a certificate or degree in the other. 
9. Agency and Facilities Closures 
Here we discuss the agencies that could be closed down or reduced significantly in 
scope either because private industry can serve the DOD better than maintaining a full 
agency or because technology has developed enough that the environment we live in does 
not call for the agency to exist in its current form. The agencies chosen for closure or 
reduction were based on the fact that there were no other similar mission-oriented agencies 
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with which they could merge. Even if an agency is closed, personnel may still be needed 
to run the close-down operations or run a smaller bureau.  
10. DeCA (Defense Commissary Agency) and Exchanges 
Problem: The Defense Commissary Agency provides services to military families 
across the globe that a private entity could perform better and at less cost using economies 
of scale.  
Research and recommendations: According to the Military Times, the 
commissary budget took a 21% cut in FY2020, due to the DOD’s budget request being 
approved by Congress (Jowers, 2019). Supposedly, military families will not see a change 
in services, but the DOD does plan to cut 1,500 workers worldwide and 500 in staff 
members. The labor cuts come as the department gears up to merge the three military 
exchange systems—AAFES, Navy Exchange Service Command, and Marine Corps 
Exchange—and the commissary system into one “defense resale enterprise,” in efforts to 
save tax dollar (Military Times, 2021). Both the commissary systems and the exchanges 
are perks to the servicemen and women and their families. Unfortunately, these perks 
incurred $1.3 billion in subsidies in 2019 from the taxpayers (Military Times, 2020). Each 
service has its own board of directors to align operations and services (Defense Primer, 
2017). So, if Congress is considering cutting DeCA’s budget and doing away with the 
subsidies that allow the commissaries and exchanges (C/EX) to sell products at about 30% 
less than is typical at off-post grocery stores, then for all intents and purposes the agency 
should not exist.  
We suggest that the Defense Commissary Agency be reduced to a bureau size office 
underneath the Washington Headquarter Services. From this position, the new bureau 
would contract with a retail provider(s) that then operates the facilities according to the 
same standards as the C/EX board does. The privately run facilities would not be advertised 
as the owners’ corporate store, but would remain U.S. government property and simply 
operate under terms and conditions established by the DeCA replacement bureau to ensure 
that the same standards of service are met. The service provider would be contracted with 
in the same manner as other government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities.  
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The GOCO C/EX would be owned or leased by the U.S. government and managed 
by third-party contractors. The GOCO facilities would be required to follow the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS). While the contractor would operate within a government-owned facility, they 
would not represent the government. The contractor ultimately delivers to the government 
the products and services in its statement of work that could be managed by a very small 
office of government FTEs, as opposed to a full agency.  
The GOCO contract should use the same type of formatting as what is prescribed 
for financial management regulations, in that the services provided are reviewed every 5 
years and profit is fixed over the same period of time. Prices would fluctuate from year to 
year in order to make the C/EX working capital generate the agreed upon profit margins in 
fixed price contracting arrangement. The terms of the contract should be extended out 5–
25 years, depending on the contractors’ performance in the first iteration of privatization 
of the C/EX system. The longer service term allows the contractor to capitalize on the 
absorption of 236 commissaries in operation in 13 countries and two U.S. territories and 
sales of $4.5 billion in 2019. The military exchanges sold $10.6 billion in goods and had 
500+ locations within 18 countries (US Sales Corp, 2020). This amount of purchasing and 
distribution power would benefit any major retailer, such as Amazon, Walmart, Target, or 
a consortium looking to expand its footprint in retail dry goods and groceries.  
Privatization of the day-to-day operations of C/EX facilities is in the best interest 
of the military patrons, the DOD, and taxpayers. Innovations that are readily accessible to 
a private contractor, such as delivery service to the customer’s door, loyalty programs, and 
supply chain management efficiencies, which would enhance the shopping experience. By 
privatizing the C/EX system, the DOD lifts another heavy burden off its budget and puts it 
on a path toward being fully financially solvent without the taxpayer fitting the subsidy 
bill. 
11. Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) 
Problem: Technology has advanced enough in the past decades that there is not a 
need to maintain a full agency to account for unknown warfighters (Killed in Action 
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(KIA)), track Missing In Action (MIA) warfighters from past wars, and negotiate freedom 
for POWs (Friedman, 2014). 
Research and recommendations: Robert Russell Garwood, a U.S. Marine Corps 
private first class, is considered to be the last American POW. He was captured in 
September 1965, near Da Nang, Quang Nam Province, Vietnam. Garwood was transported 
to North Vietnam in 1969 and was reported to have been released in 1973 alongside the 
other U.S. POWs as a result of the Paris Peace Accords. Though, he did not return to the 
U.S. territory until March 22, 1979 (Garwood, 2020). It has been over 40 years since the 
United States has had a POW that needed an agency to provide support.  
When Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl was captured in 2009 and taken prisoner, the military 
was still in Afghanistan and did not leave the combat theater for many more years. More 
POWs were not taken in Afghanistan because, again, technology has given the warfighter 
new communication devices that are issued to every warfighter, not just radio personnel as 
was done in Vietnam. Personnel information management and surveillance technologies 
of the combat zone has given commands the ability to know more details of the enemy and 
terrain (Friedman, 2014). 
Today KIA remains can be sent off to labs for analysis and identified through a 
number of records. Those records could all be converted to electronic versions, if not 
already, and be maintained by the individual services. MIAs in future wars will become 
less frequent with all the GPS tracking devices, consolidated services records, and 
battlefield accountability that are in place today. Based on the fact that future wars will 
have fewer and fewer POWs and MIAs, we suggest that the services provided by the DPAA 
be moved back to the military departments and the agency be closed. 
12. Agency Expansions and Operations Changes  
In order to serve the DOD better some changes in mission and operational routines 
in DAFA should be changed, especially now that some of the agencies have or will have 
the ability to work remotely. The DOD should take advantage of the inevitable, which 
COVID-19 simply ushered in more quickly. 
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a. Remote command of agencies  
Problem: The DOD spends too much on moving personnel every year to the high 
cost locality of the NCR. 
Research and recommendations: According to a 2015 GAO report (Farrell, 2015) 
the costs of a normal active-duty family PCS move was above $13,000, whereas a stateside 
moves were around $10,000. The study did not include any costs for federal civilian moves; 
however, those moves should cost approximately the same (Doornobos, 2018). 
The report goes on to say that roughly 25,000 civilian federal workers move 
annually, these workers represent professions from veterinarians, contract managers, and 
senior executives (SES) (Doornobos, 2018). DOD civilians make up 26% of the over 2.7 
million, or approximately 718,000 persons, Executive Branch Civilian FTEs, which 
calculates to roughly 6,500 DOD civilian PCS moves each year or $65 million. This money 
could be used elsewhere if the DOD were to hire in a manner that allowed employees to 
stay where they live now that fewer and fewer positions truly require being next to other 
personnel or the work being performed. Table 4 provides a visual of this idea.  
Table 4. Federal Workforce Statistics. Source: OMB (2020, p. 53). 
 
 
This augments our other recommendations of moving agency headquarters out of 
the NCR and developing a secure universal video conferencing platform that will 
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accommodate all agencies within in the DOD so that virtual labor pools are established 
and, therefore, remote command of the personnel therein is feasible. 
b. Enhanced internet connectivity for all DOD employees 
Problem: Some remote DOD employees do not currently have enough bandwidth 
within their alternative workplaces to sustain optimal connectivity and conference with 
others.  
Research and recommendations: The DOD needs to ensure that affected DOD 
employees have access to the highest quality of internet connectivity in order to create 
viable virtual labor pools, have remote command and control, and secure universal video 
conferencing. We recommend investing in high bandwidth cabling or WiFi to 
accommodate those workers that have less than optimal connectivity. With the savings 
from less government travel and rent of building space, certain DAFA agencies could 
allocate funds to providing high quality, secure internet access to such employees around 
the world. 
c. Move DAFA HQs out to the heartland 
Problem: The DOD has no central agency to manage strategic moves to less 
expensive areas of the United States to save billions in property and salary costs.  
Research and recommendations: GAO has considered DOD’s portfolio of real 
estate and facilities, valued over $1.3 trillion, to be a high-risk area since 1997;  essentially, 
this due to a substandard job of holding the base support costs to budget and not identifying 
unused facilities that account for over 26 million acres of real property (Serbu, 2021). 
Therefore, the DOD should create DREA and move DAFA headquarters farther away from 
the beltway of Washington, DC, or as it is also known, the NCR. There is no valid reason 
to keep a full staff of an agency’s headquarters in the DC area. A handful of personnel 
could be stationed in either the Pentagon or the auxiliary building the Mark Center, which 
is located nearby in Arlington, VA, but the channels of communications are strong enough 
that those who do not need to interact with the highest levels of the DOD or Congress could 
be moved out to less expensive areas of the country. By moving out of the NCR and into 
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lower cost of living areas, the amount of salary expenditures saved with the reduction of 
locality pay will be a significant savings. If such a move happened, the agency could 
potentially lose some talent with the workforce personnel that decided not to move, but the 
loss will be eventually replaceable.  
The Federal News Network argues that federal agencies should stay in the NCR for 
a few simple reasons: talent drain, access to Congress, and the interagency process (Neal, 
2019). However, these arguments are spurious at best. COVID-19 has proven these 
arguments meaningless. The HIRE (Helping Infrastructure Restore the Economy) ACT is 
looking at moving the following headquarters out of the NCR: 
d. Create singular point of entry for consolidated systems 
Problem: The DOD has fractured human resource (HR) offices throughout the 
department that do not maintain one unified repository of its human assets.  
Research and recommendations: DFAS was established to provide 
standardization, consolidation, and improvement of accounting and financial functions 
throughout the DOD. All payments and receivables move through DFAS; it allows for a 
uniform system of financial management in the DOD. The same concept should be applied 
with HR services (Candreva, 2017 p. 383). The Defense Human Resource Agency 
(DHRA), which is discussed later on in Agency Mission Expansions, is in a distinctive 
position to become the fully integrated HR agency for all of the DOD. In doing so, a fully 
integrated HR repository such as the Army’s Vantage (see Figure 3) should be created 
within DHRA.  
Vantage is a comprehensive data management platform designed to 
integrate data from new and legacy systems in any form and at any scale. 
The program enables the Army to view itself by providing senior leaders, 
soldiers, staff, and analytic communities with a common, integrated data 
platform to visualize and analyze the current and predicted future state(s) of 
the Army….Army Vantage offers near real-time visibility and access to 
Army data sources, facilitating rapid decision-making while supporting 
strategic, operational and tactical planning; standardizing the way the Army 
views and manages current and legacy, structured and unstructured data; 
and providing a continuous real-time perspective into the pulse of the entire 
Army. (Vantage, 2021, paras. 1–2).  
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The Army Vantage Dashboard for visual purposes is pictured in Figure 3 
 
Figure 3. Army Vantage Dashboard. Source: U.S. Army Vantage 
(2020). 
Through such a platform, DHRA could not only take care of all the DOD’s HR 
services, but also assist in resourcing DOD personnel across agencies by monitoring which 
agencies are working at full capacity and which ones have slack, meaning that personnel 
could be used for other purposes in other agencies or services. By creating resource models, 
such as what DCMA has, the DHRA could not only drill down to the individual level of 
capacity for full employment, but see the individual’s skills and certifications to optimize 
the process, like the baseball card system, addressed in the next paragraph. Lastly, a unified 
system could move pertinent information more cleanly to the Veterans Administration, 
when necessary.  
Individual Personal Talent Statistics, which we call Baseball Cards, give an outlay 
of all the performance stats for your employees and the other agency personnel: batting 
averages, home runs, errors, ERAs, win/loss records. An individual’s performance is 
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recorded and when a person possesses the right skills, then they may be called up to play 
in another position either temporarily or permanently. The HR repository would also 
streamline discussions about how to compensate, incentivize, move players up to first 
string, or cut them from the team altogether. Government FTEs could remain with their 
same agency and work on projects for another as well through reimbursables. The 
requesting agency could request set aside days for their projects and/or the employee could 
work overtime and still cost as much as an outside contractor. 
This platform could also help the DOD reduce the amount of outside contracted 
services by utilizing the already in place DOD FTEs to the fullest extent. The Vantage 
platforms could make the military services’ needs internally accessed based. Congress has 
a mandate on reducing the amount of outside contracted services and this could help fulfill 
that mandate. 
Beginning in 2001, Congress enacted legislation to improve the DOD’s 
ability to manage its acquisitions of contracted services, to make more 
strategic decisions about the appropriate workforce mix, and to better align 
resource needs through the budget process to achieve that mix. As part of 
these efforts, Section 2330a of Title 10 of the U.S. Code requires the DOD 
to conduct certain activities, including: 
• Establishing a data collection system to provide management 
information with regard to service purchases by the military 
departments and defense agencies. 
• Compiling an annual inventory of services contracted for or on behalf 
of the DOD during the preceding fiscal year. This inventory is intended, 
in part, to help provide better insight into the number of contractor FTEs 
providing services to the department and the functions they are 
performing. 
• Further, this section requires the military departments and defense 
agencies to undertake certain actions using the inventory, including: 
• Reviewing the contracts and activities in the inventory for which the 
secretary or agency head is responsible to ensure that personal services 
contracts in the inventory are performed under applicable statutes and 
regulations and to identify contracted functions that the DOD should 
consider for conversion to government performance, also known as 
insourcing. 
• Developing a plan, including an enforcement mechanism and approval 
process, to use the inventory for strategic workforce planning, 
workforce mix determinations, and budget decisions. (DiNapoli, 2018) 
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13. Service Expansions 
a. À la carte services (DCMA-specific) 
Problem: Within DCMA there are some Contract Management Offices (CMO) 
that cannot take the full complement of 71 administrative services, as provided for in FAR 
42.203, and must reduce the number of services on some contracts in order to provide the 
services that are critical to the full workload of contracts at the CMO based on risk.  
Research and recommendations: Each agency should be given the opportunity to 
expand or offer a better “menu” of the services and be given the funding to maintain these 
services on an “as needed” basis. This means that the newly upgraded DHRA would be the 
go-to research if there are capabilities and capacity in DAFA first before procuring outside 
services. This process would similar to the commercial procurement process in which 
buying activities must check the GSA schedule before procuring the products elsewhere. 
Once DAFA support is procured, the configuration of KTR to FTE ratio needed to support 
the mission would be determined. The contracting officers would have access to the 
aforementioned HR system to bring together the team.  
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper has, in essence, created an end result of the DAFA 
budget cuts as “doing less with less,” though the intent is to always to “do more with less.” 
But, it is not really—the budget cuts are simply a shift of funds from DAFA budgets to 
military department procurement funds. For DCMA this means receiving limited 
delegations from their customers. DCMA indicated  that putting the agency in a better 
position to serve its customers’ highest needs is what is most important. In order to do this, 
the agency incorporated a “high value/high risk, non-core-mission initiative” for contract 
acceptance. The focus of this initiative is to direct resources away from low value and non-
mission work and back to the customer. The overall objective is for DCMA to support 
high-risk work and to increase warfighter lethality and readiness. The agency no longer 
accepts delegations for any contract or delivery order below $300,000, except when the 
work is for an item causing a serious readiness degrader, or has risk associated with it such 
as that in items 1–12: 
1. Arms Ammunition Explosives 
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2. Classified Data (DD254) 
3. Contact Financing 
4. Government Property 
5. Surveillance Criticality Designator (SCD) A or B 
6. Critical Safety Items (CSI) 
7. First Article Test (FAT) 
8. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
9. High Risk Items/Vendors 
10. Higher-level Quality Requirements 
11. Safety of Flight (SOF) 
12. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Strategic Partners/Alliances 
In order to manage this initiative, DCMA developed a “WAL” or Workload 
Acceptance Lead who is responsible for making the determination on whether the contracts 
meet the logic explained previously to be retained or if they need to be returned to the 
issuing office. This effort has to be a critically monitored program in order to ensure that 
DCMA does not work themselves out of business by returning too many contracts to the 
issuing offices. The balance will be critical to maintain what workload needs to be kept 
and what can be retained. The buying activities do have the option to challenge a WAL 
decision; however, the applicable DCMA region who oversees the buying activity will 
decide whether to retain administration or not.  
We studied topic of à la carte administration. Typically when administration is 
delegated to DCMA, the functions under FAR Part 42.201 are all delegated, usually 
without exception. It is virtually impossible that DCMA can continue to sustain the “all or 
nothing approach” with the continual appropriation reductions on the agency’s FTEs. 
Managing these delegated functions is extremely costly to DCMA. The idea of à la carte 
is a negotiation between buying activity and DCMA to decide from the menu of services 
in FAR 42.201 what is most critical.  
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Non-essential activities can be cut so that personnel can be freed up to perform 
more valuable work. Some contracts do not need engineering support, if it is not required 
the engineering personnel should not have to conduct Contract Technical Review (CTR). 
When monitoring and approving contract financing is not necessary, then the work of a CA 
and ACO could be reduced and focused on higher risk activities. If there were a limit to 
the services DCMA provides on certain contracts, then some DCMA offices could more 
judiciously allocate its resources. DCMA would face challenges in how to track that within 
their administration systems, such as MOCAS, so that whatever functions were needed 
would actually be tracked.  
However, this could be remedied by coding in the ACO notebook, a place in 
MOCAS that indicates characteristics of the contract. Many buying activities have 
indicated they would like to have DCMA administer all or more of their contracts, but 
because of system issues, such as compatibility, the process ends up impossible to 
accomplish the work by both the buying activity and DCMA. System compatibilities 
between customers, contracting shops, and DCMA still impede the flow of contract 
administration. The idea of compatibility is not just necessary for DCMA to become a more 
valuable service provider to its customers, but is one that should be extrapolated across the 
DOD in order to allow for the expansion of services.  
DCMA, as all agencies in general, develop their own priorities, but the mission and 
goals are, in general and overarching terms, not at the granular level aligned with the 
requirements and wants of its customers. DCMA should work to align and prioritize 
administrative services together with its customers so that time and energy are spent on 
those functions that are clearly needed before accepting the contract. Seventy-one services 
of contract administration exist in FAR 42.203, and not all services are necessary for every 
contract, as stated previously. Instead of taking the “all or nothing” approach to contract 
administration, the à la carte approach would supplement the GO/NO method, allowing 
DCMA to administer more contracts and work on the cost savings functions that makes 
DCMA one of the few agencies that can show a real return on investment for the services 
it provides.  
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One example of a service to discontinue would be On Time Delivery (OTD). This 
is one of DCMA’s top priorities and many industrial specialists have been hired to meet 
these metrics. However, for a large number of DLA contracts, the OTD is meaningless to 
the buying activity. DLA awards contracts based on inventory counts in depots. If the first 
contractor does not perform and deliver, the automated system issues another solicitation 
and purchase order until ordering requirements are fulfilled. Yet, because of its mission 
priorities, DCMA chases all the low risk/low value contracts to satisfy its own made up 
metrics. DCMA spins its wheels on tracking products that are only a few days overdue 
when the buying activities are not asking for this. Negotiate this service out of a large 
number of contracts so the agency can concentrate on those that really require the 
monitoring. 
Another DCMA priority is the resolution of 90% of all canceling funds by the end 
of the fiscal year; either the contractor will use the funds or the funded are de-obligated in 
order to buy more product or service within the returned funds before they cancel. In other 
words, in more procurement acquisitions the funds expire in the fourth year and can no 
longer be obligated for new requirements, but are still available to pay the bills on the 
contract for which they are intended. If the funds are not invoiced by the end of the 
canceling year, they are no longer available for anything, including to pay the bills on said 
contract. DCMA communicates with the contractor to determine whether all the funds left 
on the contract will be invoiced. If not, DCMA must de-obligate the excess funds from 
affected fixed-priced contracts to return back to the buying activities, usually by the last 
quarter in the expiring year. Three months’ time is not enough time for the buying activities 
determine whether they need more of the same product, then reprogram the funds and 
finally execute. Canceling funds coding, contractor communication, de-obligating, and 
transmitting to the buy activities serves no purpose for either the customer or DCMA. 
If DCMA were to allocate resources based on risks across the universe of its 
contract workload and contractors versus easily automated functions, then its workforce 
would become problem solvers rather than functionaries chasing metrics. Decision-
makers, such as the ACO, could take on more contract actions across a wider field of 
contractors that require critical thinking, instead of working on day-to-day perfunctory 
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actions. Different functions may view risk in a different way. Would it be best to have the 
program manager assign the risk rating and see if it is a product or service they can accept 
or not? If DCMA were to look into risk rating, they would need to do it in a collaborative 
way in order to have the stakeholders agree.  
In regards to return on investment (ROI), in many instances DCMA finds savings 
in the thousands while analyzing a pricing case, negotiating an Undefinitized Contract 
Action (UCA) or reviewing progress payment withholds. The savings from DCMA’s 
scaled work end up back with the buying activities. If DCMA were able to develop a 
method to track, quantify, and re-coup these savings, most of the agency’s salaries and 
costs would be paid simply through these ROIs. 
In order to satisfy the quality functions that are delegated to DCMA and still keep 
to the mantra of “doing less with less,” IT enhancements would need to take place in order 
to facilitate quality inspection and acceptance in a virtual world where Quality Assurance 
Representatives (QAR) can inspect product remotely. First, a clause would have to be 
crafted and approved into the FAR/DFARS to ensure that contractors have the proper 
equipment, i.e., video cameras, secure internet connection, and computer capabilities to 
demonstrate that the product presented to the QAR conforms to the terms and conditions 
of the contract. 
DCMA leadership should champion the recommendations put forth here. The 
investments in the agency here and today will pay dividends tomorrow for the department. 
Said recommendations must be fully developed and feasibility studies conducted before 
presenting them to the OSD A&S undersecretary as a part of the Budget Estimate Submittal 
(BES). If top DCMA leadership can flip the script of “doing less with less” into 
“accomplishing twice as much with just a little more,” then the agency has an opportunity 
to create more value for its customers.  
DCMA’s customers must become comfortable with relinquishing control over a 
portion of their contracting workload so that DCMA can develop the personnel, policy, and 
procedure to take over the pre-award activities of some simple acquisitions LPTA. This 
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will not be an overnight, turnkey event. Knowledge transfers, agreement, and coordination 
must take place to ensure a smooth transition. 
Although all DOD DAWIA Level II-certified contracting personnel have been 
trained on the aspects of pre-award functions, the fact is, if those skills are not used, they 
atrophy. In the 2 years of mandatory contracts training, the majority of classes focus on the 
pre-award and award side of contracting, and very little to the post-award. Many DCMA 
1102s (contracting personnel) are very comfortable in the post-award realm and may not 
wish to relearn what they have been taught, but in order to stay viable some of those brain 
muscles will have to be exercised. There will be a cultural massaging of the agency to ready 
itself for change. 
Finally, procurement contracting officers and contract specialists are not born; they 
are educated and developed over time. The skills of acquisition planning, market research, 
and solicitation development will take time to minimize mistakes and give confidence to 
customers that DCMA can handle the job. 
b. Crossover functions between agencies 
Problem: Full optimal use of DAFA falls short by not using the resources of 
services that other DAFA agencies can provide. 
Research and recommendations: There are professional functions that if one 
agency is in short supply of personnel to perform, then another agency could augment to 
complete. This is particularly true within the 1102 (contracting) community of the DOD. 
For example, if DLA were inundated with pre-award contract actions that it could not 
handle at current staffing, then it could turn to the newly expanded DHRA to see if there 
are contracts personnel who are working at a less than optimum level who could be 
employed to assist DLA temporarily.  
Individuals might not agree to temporarily work for other agencies if this was not 
in the terms and conditions of their hiring agreement. Currently each agency has their own 
acquisition guidance, not just the FAR and DFARS, and it could take time for people to 
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learn these rules and adjust to the systems in not just acquisition but any systems that were 
used, depending on the career field. 
c. Transfer pre-award contracting to DCMA or the newly conjoined 
agency  
Problem: The military service buying activities all have a workload of simpler 
contracts, such as a well-defined requirement under the Simplified Acquisition Threshold 
(SAT), Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA), and supply purchase using best 
value trade-off that take time away from the command’s ability to work on the more 
complex and, thus, more risky contracts.  
Research and recommendations: Transfer pre-award functions of well-defined 
requirements, LPTAs, and supply best value trade-off competitive requirements could 
transfer to DCMA, freeing up buying activities to concentrate on the more complex 
acquisitions and grants. Although DCMA should be brought into the acquisition planning 
process, it unfortunately rarely is. It would be advantageous for the agency that is going to 
administer the contract to be the one that prepares the well-established solicitation, if not 
awards, the contract. 
The pre-award contracting processes and procedures that would occur during the 
award phase are as follows: 
1. Pre-award notification to unsuccessful offeror’s: Prior to contract award, 
the DCMA PCO would give written notice to the unsuccessful offerors 
that their proposals did not fall within the competitive range.  
2. Award Announcements: DCMA would write up the award announcement 
and synopsis for upload on the proper announcement platforms.  
3. Awarding a contract: After completion of final evaluations and the 
business clearance approval from the Buying Activity, the DCMA’s PCO 
would then coordinate with the BA contract specialists to upload the 
awarded contract into the proper repositories, such as the Electronic Data 
Access (EDA) and the BA’s repository. The successful offeror would be 
contacted by DCMA and set up a Post Award Orientation Conference. 
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This truncated process would speed up the time by which the customer 
receives its product or service is initiated. All too often the time that is 
taken to move the award into the proper platforms and the contract 
uploaded into the Mechanization of Contract Administrations System 
(MOCAS) can impede the time that the contractor needs to start to 
perform on the contract. A seamless process would ensure conversations 
between the Contract Administration Office (CAO-DCMA) and the 
contractor before and after award. 
4. Post-award debriefings: The post-award debriefing would be conducted by 
DCMA and would be the administrator of any protests that may arise 10 
days after the debrief. DCMA counsel is well versed in protests and could 
handle this function adroitly. Since the types of contracts that would be 
delegated to DCMA for award would be well-defined, possibly those 
under the Simple Acquisition Threshold (SAT) and LPTAs, the chances of 
protests are minimal.  
5. Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR): The assignment of a COR is 
not necessary since DCMA already performs the technical or 
administrative functions on DOD contracts. DCMA simply expands its 
services into the pre-award side, administering the same type of contracts 
that are within its core mission. 
6. Contract/modification distribution: Any modifications resulting from the 
pre-award discussions and PAOC would be written by DCMA and 
distributed to all stakeholders. 
7. Contracting Action Report: After award, DCMA would be responsible for 
uploading all contract data into the repository called the Federal 
Procurement Data System (FPDS). 
8. Comprehensive Resource Reviews. There is no comprehensive method by 
which to analyze the work capacity of individual FTEs and agencies to 
ensure that all workers are utilized to the fullest and most valuable extent. 
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Research and recommendations: Use resource reviews in the newly formed 
DHRA to move government FTEs to positions that need fulfillment by another government 
FTE, both virtually and physically, temporarily and permanently. Government FTEs could 
be between agencies on a six month or annual basis with just a line of accounting change 
through a MICR, but the lending agency retains the FTE on the books. 
14. Service Privatization 
a. Commissary and Exchange (C/EX) services 
Problem: Commissary services are like banking services, in that they are not 
inherently government functions and could be awarded to commercial corporations, just 
like banking is across all CONUS and OCONUS facilities worldwide (If the closure of 
DeCA is not implemented in whole.). 
Research and recommendations: In some countries and military installations, 
depending on size and location of the base, commissaries are a very necessary component 
to maintain a quality of life for those stationed there. However, some can be eliminated due 
to availability of shopping locations within a close proximity to the installation. Certain 
installations would need to have commissaries due to the vast difference in the culture and 
supplies of that country or the distance to travel off of the installation. 
The military personnel would still reap the benefits of a commissary even if the 
services were privatized, i.e., products would still be offered without the tax burden. 
Additionally, other than maintenance of buildings, if this was a competitive acquisition for 
management of the commissary, the DOD would have less burden of management. A study 
would need to be performed with key factors of which locations in fact needed access to a 
privatized commissary. With any change the transition would cause challenges, and morale 
for locations in which commissaries would be closing could be impacted. 
b. Inherently governmental activities review 
Problem: The DOD blurs the lines between inherently governmental activities and 
commercial activities. 
47 
Research and recommendations: The FAR states that “contracts shall not be used 
for the performance of inherently governmental functions” (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, 2021). Some examples of inherently governmental functions are criminal 
investigations, commanding military forces, conducting operations in relation to foreign 
policy, budget planning and requests, directing/selecting federal employees, specific 
contract actions, legal advice, inspection and acceptance of goods, FOIA actions, and 
specific law enforcement actions.  
The 2016 GAO report DOD ICS discusses specific issues and findings in relation 
to the government’s use of service contracts. Service components are working to begin 
identifying the six elements of their certification letters. 
Element 1— Explanation of the methodology used to conduct the review 
and criteria for selecting contracts for review. FY2014 OSD Guidance also 
required components to discuss the three following review techniques 32 in 
the certification letters, which we considered as part of the required 
discussion on a Component’s ICS review methodology. 
Element 2—Identification of any inherently governmental functions or 
unauthorized personal services contracts, with a plan of action to either 
divest, correct, or realign such functions to government performance. 
Element 3—Identification of contracts under which closely associated with 
inherently governmental functions are being performed, with an 
explanation of the steps taken to ensure appropriate government control and 
oversight of such functions or, if necessary, a plan to either divest or realign 
such functions to government performance. 
Element 4—Identification of contracted services to be realigned to 
government performance that should be: exempt from private-sector 
performance in accordance with DOD Instruction 1100.22, “Policy and 
Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix,” April 12, 2010; require 
special consideration under 10 U.S.C. § 2463; or could be more cost 
effectively performed by government civilians, consistent with DOD 
Instruction 7041.04, “Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian 
and Active Duty Military Manpower and Contract Support,” July 3, 2013. 
Element 5—Actions taken or considered in regards to annual program 
reviews and budget processes to ensure appropriate (re)allocation of 
resources based on reviews conducted. The FY2014 OSD Guidance also 
required components to discuss in their certification letters how they used 
the ICS reviews and subsequent workforce shaping decisions to inform 
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programming and budget matters, including requests to realign work, as 
appropriate, to military or civilian performance, and to inform their strategic 
workforce planning efforts, 33 which we considered as part of the required 
discussion on a component’s use of the ICS. 
Element 6a —A table showing the results of these reviews in terms of the 
number of CFTEs and dollars associated with the following categories: 
• Inherently governmental functions 
• CAIG functions 
• Critical functions 
• Unauthorized personal services 
• Authorized personal services 
• Commercial functions 
• Element 6b—If relied upon, components should list Overseas 
Contingency Operation funded functions in a separate table, to the 
maximum extent practicable. (DiNapoli, 2016) 
. 
Challenges and Issues—Even though Services are working to certify without 
having to identify service contracts that are inherently governmental, the GAO believes 
these are being underreported. To compare this, approximately $10.8 billion in obligations 
per year are identified as closely related to inherently governmental functions. 
From the previous statistics, it is clear that the subject of inherently governmental 
contract functions is a large issue within the DOD and DAFA. In 2014 the GAO 
recommended that the DOD address the issues in relation to the use of inherently 
governmental service contracts along with issues closely related to these functions.  
Within the DOD, specifically DAFA, managers are not sufficiently trained to 
identify contracts related to inherently governmental functions. DAFA has a mix of COs 
that are either awarding fast-paced contracts, then handing them off to ACOs who are 
taking on the administration and not knowing the background or specific legal 
determinations needed to clear the inherently governmental award action hurdles. At times, 
it is easier to have contractor personnel perform functions. Having contractor personnel 
perform functions when they are able to be sources assists DOD personnel in relieving 
management functions, scheduling issues, training, etc. However, per GAO-17-17, “the 
government can become overly reliant on contractors in some situations, such as when a 
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contractor performs functions that put an agency at risk of losing control over functions 
that are core to its mission and operations” (DiNapoli, 2017, p. 6). 
Each DOD agency has been tasked to develop a plan to confirm that the 
determination prior to award of a service contract is not inherently governmental. The plan 
must include enforcement methods and an approval process. Agencies and Services have 
90 days to report that their contracts have been entered into the tracking system and 
performed properly, and that they do not contain inherently governmental services or 
services closely related to inherently governmental services.  
Some Services have already started to implement their plan to track and manage 
inherently governmental actions. Most agencies were tracking these actions by a selection 
in the FPDS-NG system. However, the Army implemented its CMRA system to collect the 
necessary data to file their reports. GAO audit report GAO-17-17 states that the DOD has 
been working to establish a Common Manpower System in order to inventory the service 
contracts. However, this was started in 2011 and has still not been finalized (DiNapoli, 
2017) 
This process would be improved and easier to audit if all DOD agencies used the 
same approval process and documents. It has often been reported that the approval process 
for service contracts is lengthy and confusing along with uncertainties in the approval 
authority and responsibilities. The criteria for improving these service contracts should 
match or coincide with the six elements the GAO requires to be submitted on the yearly 
certification letters. DAFA agencies could also develop better ways to estimate the actual 
contract FTEs needed, and a robust reporting system would help to support this estimate. 
c. ICS and Government Mandates 
Problem: ICS and Services Contract Reporting (SCR) data reported to Congress is 
not effective to maximize DOD’s strategic planning, decision-making efforts regarding 
manpower, budgeting, acquisition of services, and utilization of Fourth Estate resources; 
and reduce commercial contracted services.  
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Research and recommendation: The DOD is not receiving the best cost, quality, 
and performance by offering the excess activities to outside contractors before internal 
agencies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has revised the DOD’s Contractor 
Manpower Reporting Initiative to implement the recommendations of the advisory panel 
under the NDAA FY2016, section 809, to develop replacement approach to the ICS. The 
number of DOD projects and activities increases every year. Congress has mandated that 
the DOD use the ICS to project future contracted services, and DAFA should be part of the 
conversation and solution. There is a perception in Congress and America at large that the 
DOD civilian employee population is bloated; therefore, many services are categorized as 
other than inherently government work, so that the funding can be transferred to 
procurement funding. Private contractors are hired for three year terms at rates and time 
periods that make the activities more expensive in the long run, yet the public is none the 
wiser, as to the higher costs.  
“FPDS-NG provides, for contract actions of at least $3,000, information on the 
amount of the contract action, identification codes indicating whether the firm providing 
the service is a small business, the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) code for the service being purchased, and the primary Product Service Code 
(PSC), a more finely grained indicator than NAICS codes of the nature of the goods and 
services purchased” (Moore, et. al., 2017, pp. xvii-xviii). Of the eight service portfolio 
groups, several are required to be included in military departmental submissions to 
Congress for intentional outside sourcing: equipment-related services, logistics 
management services, electronics and communications services, and knowledge-based 
services.  
The two areas of greatest interest are knowledge-based and logistics management. 
In FY2020, contractors began reporting manpower data relating to the performance of 
contracts into the System for Award Management (SAM.gov) database. The DOD Service 
Contract Report provides data by PSC code, number of FTEs, and total cost invoiced. Total 
Professional Support service total for FY2020: 1600 transactions with 83,450 FTEs 
(primes and subs) at $16.7 billion in invoices, which is an average $200,240 cost per FTE 
or average cost of $96.27 per hour. The Support-Management Logistics Support provided 
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totals for FY2020 of 220 transactions, 42,588 FTEs and $4.1 billion, which is an average 
cost of $95,670.22 per FTE or $45.99 per labor hour.  
We compared the SCR Program Management/Support average labor rate of $70 
per hour to DCMA average labor rate of $55 per hour, which indicates the SCR contractor 
rate is 21% higher (Comparably, 2021). Therefore, for each FTE position filled by a 
DCMA employee rather than a contractor, the DOD would save $122 per day or $29,720 
annually excluding indirect/overhead costs. This also excludes the overhead costs of 
contractors, which is typically higher than government employees. DODI Policy and 
Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, section 5 indicates the cost as a deciding 
factor in workforce mix: “DOD Components shall use DOD civilian personnel to perform 
the function unless DOD civilians are not the low-cost provider or there is a legal, 
regulatory, or procedural impediment” (DOD, 2017, p. 15). DOD components are required 
to conduct cost comparisons and complete procurements. The cost for services is least 
expensive for military followed by DOD civilians and the highest costs to contractors. 
Therefore, besides the tracking of PSC codes, the data is available to complete an analysis. 
DOD instruction should be followed and government civilians used first before issuing a 
contract to a contractor. 
15. Service Enhancements 
a. Crossover functions or hybrid employees  
Problem: The full potential of some government FTEs is not realized since the 
employee is assigned one job designator while working in an agencies. 
Research and recommendations: The newly enhanced DHRA would have the 
ability to maintain and manage skills of government FTEs in order to provide the DOD 
requiring agencies a complement of employees that can work several types of projects over 
time. 
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b. Alignment of priorities with Military Service customers (Example: 
canceling funds and OTD) 
Problem: Research is showing that the MS and DAFAs do not have their main 
priorities aligned. The services have priorities set at the program level, not on smaller 
delivery schedules. 
Research and recommendations:  
Navy Priority—Sound business decisions utilizing an acquisition strategy that 
minimizes time and cost.  
Army Priority—Sustainment. Dr. Mark T. Esper, the Secretary of the Army and 
Gen. Mark A. Milley, the Chief of Staff of the Army, have stated the Army priority must 
be to “ensure warfighting formations have sufficient infantry, armor, engineer, artillery, 
and air defense assets … and robust logistical support must be readily available to units” 
(DiNapoli, 2018). 
Air Force Priority—Dr. William LaPlante, the assistant secretary of the Air 
Force for acquisition, outlined the five key areas of [priorities]. 
• Get high priority programs right and keep them on the right track. 
• Improve relationships and transparency with stakeholders. 
• Own the technical baseline for important programs. 
• Build [“Better Buying Power”] to improve business and small business 
in order to achieve best program outcomes. 
• Build long-term strategy, resiliency to peer competitors, experiment and 
innovate—strategic agility. (U.S. Air Force, 2015, para. 1) 
DAFA’s priority number 1 is on time delivery (OTD), “enhance lethality through 
the on-time delivery of quality products.” (Defense Contract Management Agency, 2020) 
Under the goal, there are four objectives: 
• Improve delivery performance by influencing timely delivery of 
production outputs, 
• Improve product quality by influencing industrial base performance, 
• Improve customer support and force readiness by reducing process 
cycle times, [and] 
• Enhance DOD’s protection of controlled unclassified information by 
ensuring contractors implement appropriate cyber requirements. 
(DCMA, 2020, p. 3) 
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When talking with other buying activities, they often complain about this priority 
that DCMA puts so much effort into. Yes, they understand it is important for the supplies 
to be delivered on time to the warfighter; however, DCMA measures this by being a single 
day late. Many of the buying activities did not want to entertain discussions with DCMA 
about consideration and extension modifications. However, DCMA spends the most time 
working this initiative for Contracts and Manufacturing versus other functions of their job.  
Another main priority that DCMA focuses on that does not benefit the other MS 
and DAFA’s customers is canceling funds. DCMA has a goal to reduce canceling funds 
for each year to below 10% by either having contractors submit invoices for work that has 
been performed or request or issue modifications de-obligating the funds that will not be 
used to return to the buying activities for execution. Often the funding is useless to the 
buying activity by the time it is returned, due to long processes on reprogramming the funds 
and acquisition processes. In the book, Mastering Strategy “One of the most overlooked 
aspects of crafting strategy is the need to define and set objectives” (Braun, 2014, p. 18). 
Competing priorities are shown for each of the queried agencies. Agencies might not want 
to adapt to what is decided on as the priority. 
• Permanent telework for certain personnel and/or agencies 
Problem: Government FTEs, in certain fields, are more productive when working 
from home or an alternate work site, yet are forced to come to a building to work with 
others. 
Research and recommendations: COVID-19 has put many DAFA agencies on 
an almost permanent telework footing for many of its personnel. However, most agencies 
have telework policies that only accommodate telework for a percentage of time during a 
period. According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the “official worksite 
for an employee covered by a telework agreement who is not scheduled to report at least 
twice each bi-weekly pay period on a regular and recurring basis to the regular worksite is 
the location of the telework site (e.g., home or other alternative worksite), except in certain 
temporary situations” (OPM, 2021, para. 3).  
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COVID-19 has turned a temporary situation into a semi-permanent condition. In 
order to accommodate some of the recommendations here DAFA agencies should change 
internal telework policies to allow qualified personnel to work in an approved remote 
location 100%. This will give the agencies flexibility to then make accommodations as to 
reducing their facility footprint size, collocate with another government agency, or do away 
with the workplace altogether. 
As of June 2020, 42% of the U.S. labor force was working from home, according 
to research from Stanford University. Even before COVID-19, the movement towards 
working from home was rising (Fuscaldo, 2020). At one point DCMA was at almost 100% 
telework and sustained this footing for over 3 months. DAFA agencies have made IT 
accommodations to facilitate permanent telework for their workers; however, their 
telework policies have not caught up with the situation. The DOD should continue to 
develop one department-wide video platform, such as MS Teams, that provides all the 
features of other conferencing platforms, such as Zoom and Webex, so that all DOD 
agencies can communicate with each other with optimal connectivity and security. As it 
stands today, different DAFA agencies are using different video conferencing platforms to 
hold meetings, and then refusing to use the other’s platform because it is not authorized. 
Then the two agencies are left to using a phone conference line, which does not allow for 
the same experience, such as shared screen, chats, and recordings of the meeting. 
c. Performance based compensation/Workload capacity (concept that the 
Union would accept) 
Problem: A compensation system that rewards as personnel perform their duties 
that are outside normal business practices (i.e., augmentation of other DAFA agencies). 
Research and recommendations: The DOD adopted DOD Civilian Acquisition 
Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project (AcqDemo) in 1999 for agencies to use when 
desired. DCMA adapted this performance management compensation plan for their “non-
bargaining” unit employees in 2017. The purpose of AcqDemo is “to demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) workforce can be 
further enhanced by allowing greater direct managerial control over personnel functions 
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and, at the same time, expand the opportunities available to employees through a more 
responsive and flexible personnel system” (DCMA, 2017, p. 3)   
This personnel system is developed to compensate the employee for their total job 
scope, which capitalizes on the impact of the contributions the employee makes to the 
whole agency, not just their respective position. This then funnels down to a pay panel 
board at the end of each year, where they evaluate and rank each employee’s contributions 
and then a monetary reward or pay increase is given if warranted for that employee’s 
contributions. Overall responsibility for this program is the DCMA Director.  
Since some DAFA unions will not approve AcqDemo for the bargaining unit 
employees (non-supervisorial), a new appraisal system called DOD Performance 
Management and Appraisal System (DPMAP) was rolled out. This program applies many 
of the same concepts as the AcqDemo system. However, a monetary reward is not paid out 
at the end of the rating cycle. This system requires formal feedback each quarter and allows 
the employee to also provide feedback and supporting data. This system does not prove to 
be as effective as AcqDemo, as the employees just receive a rating without the monetary 
incentive. If DAFA can develop a system that both the bargaining and non-bargaining unit 
employees can use, there would be less discernment among the population of the agencies 
to be all compared to the same system.  
As the favorable reward among the population would most likely be monetary or 
time off, the agency cannot afford this type of compensation in such a wide variety of a 
platform. Other rewards of encouragement could be the approval of overseas assignments 
and rotations for those who are interested, availability of leadership and other optional 
training courses that could benefit the employees portfolio as well as a “promote vs. Non 
promote” on each individuals yearly review, much like the Navy FITREP rating system.  
DAFA agencies should develop and adapt a performance system that encourages 
more than just meeting expectations. The system should be looked at as more of a strategy. 
Strategy has multiple different definitions. The book “Mastering Strategy, Workshops for 
Business Success,” defines strategy as follows: “Strategy is the art and science of how one 
company outperforms its competitors and itself, as measured by its profitability” (Braun, 
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2014, p. 15). This could be an outstanding baseline for DAFA to use in coming up with an 
overall model of how the agency could improve the performance management system. 
Employees should not be forced to work in a hyper competitive workplace; however, they 
should be encouraged and rewarded for work that is done beyond the expectations as well 
as for ideas and contributions that improve the agencies return on investment and provide 
a better outcome to the customers. 
d. Contingency contracting operations and response force 
Problem: Many DOD agencies struggled with normal operations when the 
COVID-19 virus hit first our nation. Everyone that could possibly telework was put on 
maximum telework, office hours varied, computer networks failed, and employees 
struggled with how to perform in a contingency environment.  
Research and recommendations: Memorandums from the OSD were being 
issued to the acquisition workforce with guidance such as the CARES Act, which impacted 
pay for contractors’ employees during the pandemic. This guidance was all new to the 
ACOs and COs, and the questions were coming in from all directions, whether it be the 
contractor or the government who needed to enact these changes. New clauses were being 
released to offer some relief when needed for contractors. Many acquisition professionals 
did not know how to enact, enforce, or operate with these clauses.  
The second largest change that occurred to normal contract operations was the 
issuance of Class Deviation 2020-O0010, Increased Progress Payments. The issuance of 
this deviation caused a ripple effect for both DCMA and the buying activities for contracts 
that contained the progress payment clause. This change allowed for the contractor to 
submit progress payments at 90%, the contractor’s total cost incurred under contracts, 
versus the normal 80% computation rate. This change required each contract when a 
contract was requested to be modified, adding burden on the government’s side. 
16. IT Enhancements 
Agencies in the Fourth Estate currently control their individual IT infrastructure 
and IT help desk, which were all handled differently and was identified as a security risk. 
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(Barnet, 2020). DISA began consolidating the Fourth Estate networks into one common-
use IT infrastructure. The start of the consolidation was planned in FY 2018 and continues 
through completion in FY2025, according to Principal Deputy Chief Information Officer 
John Sherman (Barnet, 2020). The Fourth Estate Network Optimization (4ENO) initiative 
will merge 22 services and support operations run by DISA. The agencies affected include: 
DCAA, DCMA, Defense Media Activity, Defense Microelectronics Activity, DFAS, 
DISA, DHA, DHRA, DLA, Defense Prisoner of War/MIA Accounting Agency, DTRA 
Defense Technical Information Center and MDA. Drew Jaehnig, project lead, said, “DISA 
has been working with the affected organizations for months, ensuring the network 
consolidation effort is a collaborative process. The fourth estate network optimization 
effort is expected to result in a cost avoidance for the department, which means money can 
be used for efforts supporting increased lethality” (Barnet, 2020, para. 4). 
As IT infrastructure has been identified for consolidation, the solicitation on 
beta.SAM.gov reads: “Defense Enclave Services, (DES) will provide integrated, 
standardized and cost-effective IT services; while improving security, network availability 
and reliability for the 22 DAFAs within the Fourth Estate.” (Jasper, Dec 2020, para. 3). 
The consolidation of the effort by DISA will cost $11.65 billion (Jasper, Dec 2020). The 
return on this investment will depend on how fast the transition can occur. Utilizing this 
example, other opportunities to jointly combine agencies will require an investment but the 
return in cost saving or cost avoidance in the long term will be worth it. 
a. Modernize MOCAS 
Problem: Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) is old—
it is 62 years old (Verma, 2017). The system is outdated and the number of specialists that 
can maintain the COBOLT framework is dwindling every year.  
Research and recommendations: While several policy changes have been made 
since the outbreak of COVID-19 to increase telework allowances, fewer innovative IT 
enhancements have been implemented in DCMA to maximize telework operations. Some 
of DAFA’s IT systems have still not been modernized. The primary contractual database 
for DCMA is MOCAS, The website “Fossbites” states “Meet MOCAS—World’s Oldest 
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Computer Program That’s Still in Use” (Verma, 2017). The MOCAS database is written 
in COBOL, a 61-year-old computer language that requires many more lines of coding to 
bring logic into program.  
Each year there are fewer and fewer COBOL programmers that can maintain this 
behemoth of a system that must be shut down every month for 3 days for repairs and 
maintenance. The MOCAS system is primarily used by DFAS and DCMA because they 
pay for the maintenance of the system. DFAS is responsible for the initial contract inputs 
from all of DOD buying activities, while DCMA has the responsibility to review and edit 
the contract inputs, for the contracts that are delegated thereto.  
Figure 4 represents the MOCAS active system: 
 
Figure 4. Source: MOCAS Active System 
If the DOD as a whole could work to establish a contract writing system and a 
database system such as a modern MOCAS system, the agency would be very effective 
and helpful to all of the buying activities. There is not a value-added system when DCMA 
is issuing modifications for the buying activity to turn around and just duplicate it in their 
system. If IT enhancements were made across the board for the DOD, it would be very 
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effective along with DCMA being capable of assisting more with contractual delegations. 
The recommendation for this process is that each agency and buying activity bring to a 
“working group” the requirements for their management process, along with the 
requirements for the database system, to request funding from Congress to see this process 
through to completion. Figure 5. represents the complexity of MOCAS input.  
 
Figure 5. MOCAS —A Vital Component of the DOD’s Acquisition 
Mission. Source: Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (2018, p. 
4).  
DCMA manages every part of the contract administration through MOCAS. The 
systems DCMA interfaces with, such as the Procurement Integrated Enterprise 
Environment PIEE, feed into MOCAS for management and updates. For DCMA, MOCAS 
manages approximately $1.3 trillion in obligations and over 340,000 contracts (Verma, 
2017). The DOD has an initiative to replace MOCAS. However, DCMA and DFAS are 
supporting the initiative to leave MOCAS alone and add additional eTools for DCMA and 
Sidecars for DFAS versus improving MOCAS capabilities.  
While MOCAS is the system for database managing, DCMA uses the Modification 
and Delivery Orders (MDO) to write modifications. DCMA does not issue contracts, only 
60 
manages contracts after post-award. This example ties into how almost all of the DOD 
agencies, including DAFA, use a different system to manage their contractual workload. 
The systems range from PD2 to CONWRITE, MOCAS, and MDO. Based on our research 
the buying activities indicated angst in delegating contracts to DCMA that stems from the 
fact that the contract modifications do not feed directly into their systems. Most have to 
issue “dummy” modifications after DCMA performs their action in order for it to feed into 
their system. DLA indicated that they would prefer to delegate their whole workload after 
administration to DCMA if the systems were able to interact with each other. Another 
hindering factor for MOCAS is that the contract or buying activities modification can take 
up to 30 days to populate in MOCAS. DCMA can view the contractual action in Electronic 
Data Access (EDA), but if it is not in MOCAS, it does not feed to the eTools, which means 
DCMA cannot work any post-award contractual actions. 
b. Universal Sharing and Communication Platform for DOD and Private 
Industry 
Problem: The DOD does not have a universal sharing and communication platform 
that can be used by all of the DOD, its customers, and its contractors. One unified 
collaboration platform is needed to open the channels of communication across the 
enterprise. 
Research and recommendations: This is probably the most important, needed, 
but feasible technological requirement that the DOD could implement in order to meet 
future demands of “doing less with less.” The DOD should demand a unified video 
conferencing platform that incorporates the best features of the commercially available 
platforms and equip it with the security measures necessary to have it used from the DOD 
Industrial Base, the contractors, all the way up to the Pentagon. As it stands to today, each 
agency decides which video platform will be used, such as Zoom, Webex, MS Teams, or 
Skype. If multiple agencies are using multiple platforms, but need to communicate with 
presentations, documents, and the sort, then: 
1. Stronger internet connectivity 
2. Portal to push jobs to DAFA when MS cannot handle 
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3. Allows for remote inspection and acceptance of product 
4. New FAR / DFARS clauses would be required 
 
There are many products of supplies that allow for DCMA to inspect remotely; 
however, at present there are no FAR/DFARS clauses that compel contractor to implement 
the video, measuring, and connectivity equipment to make this possible. A universal share 
portal/platform should have all the necessary software to allow the government and 
contractor to share files and hold “face to face” virtual meetings all in a secure environment. 
The DOD should create a universal sharing and communication platform that facilitates for 
interaction up and down the chain of command within the DOD all the way to our 
contractors. Then the DARS Council should bring language into the DFARS that obligates 
awardees of certain contracts to own and operate the equipment to allow the contract 
administrating office to perform inspection and acceptance remotely. Just from a quality 
control standpoint, one can see that the less time a quality assurance specialist spends on 
the road driving from facility to facility, the more time can be spent actually inspecting and 
accepting product. 
In contrast with a contract clause stating that the product could be inspected 
remotely (virtually), there would still be some products that would not ever be allowed 
video inspection, such as aircraft engines, which are so sensitive that virtual inspection 
would not be in the best interest of the government. Aircraft engines are only but one object 
that would not be a proponent of virtual acceptance. Other items could be weapons, 
ammunition, parachutes, and other flight critical items. But still the number of contracts 
that could be virtually inspected far outnumber those that could not. 
As mentioned above, multiple options exist as a base design for a universal sharing 
platform, such as Defense Collaboration Services, Zoom, Apple FaceTime, MS Teams, 
and Webex. However, the platforms, firewalls, security practices, and software protections 
different DOD agencies use make interagency communication impossible, as well as 
government-to-contractor video communication and data sharing. As it stands in 2021 
there is no directive to move all DOD and its industrial base to one platform.  
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Currently, DCAA uses Skype to video communicate, DAU uses Webex to teach 
classes, NPS uses Zoom to instruct, and DCMA, along with many other agencies, uses MS 
Teams. The DOD must select one platform and develop a vertically integrated system that 
captures the necessary features of all users and implements the security measures that 
ensure that all compartmentalized controlled and classified information that is transmitted 
stays within protocols. The development of the potential required clause as discussed 
previously could be the requirement for the contractors to use the universal software 
sharing platform that was approved by the government. The contractors would have to 
know this requirement at time of solicitation in order to estimate costs associated with 
acquiring, rolling out, and training on whichever system would be most advantageous for 
the government. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government did have to temporarily resort to 
video acceptance using tools, such as FaceTime on Apple devices when available. This 
temporary method has led the government to explore which platform will work best as this 
is likely going to be the future of acceptance for the government. Prior to COVID-19, 
Defense Collaboration Services (DCS) was the primary source for intra-government 
meetings. Only government contract holders that had possession of a Common Access 
Card (CAC) were able to support meetings with this platform.  
Most contractors preferred to use Zoom as the meeting platform as it was a simple 
URL-based website that worked best with Firefox. However, most government IT 
platforms would not allow support of this system that performed best with Firefox due to 
the security vulnerabilities currently associated with the platform. A potential preferred 
platform for both the government and contractors could be Microsoft Teams. This platform 
is available to both the private sector and a secured platform for the government and is best 
operated with Google Chrome. Microsoft Teams offers video chat, file share, chat and file 
storage. If the contractors were to not have an established account, they can go to the Web 
URL and then access the meeting by an invite URL from the government.  
At times program groups were using DOD SAFE to share documents between 
offices or agencies as needed. This is not an efficient method as multiple emails have to be 
sent to actually gain the URL for download. If it needs to be sent to a contractor, the 
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government has to log in and create a depot holding spot to gain the URL for the contractor 
to then log in and send the document. Most government agencies and organizations used 
SharePoint; however, with SharePoint access between agencies was not permitted. With 
Microsoft teams, “channels” can be created. As long as someone is invited to the channel, 
they can access the folders and share documents as needed without clogging up the email 
space and storage, which is always an issue with agencies. If the agency were to adopt a 
universal platform, the testing before implementation should be to the maximum extent 
possible, testing from both the DOD, deployed, and telework environments to ensure the 
network and system can handle the capacity that is needed.  
A system like Microsoft Teams would solve the virtual QAR acceptance issues and 
save money for the government by eliminating the maintenance of multiple conferencing 
and file sharing systems along with training the workforce for both the contractors and the 
government to be fluent on multiple platforms. This money would be saved in software 
purchasing expenses and IT support expenses by managing only one platform, creating 
experts on one system versus multiple systems. 
B. EMERGENCY SITUATION IMPROVEMENT  
1. Current Support Abilities 
• Contingency Response Force (CRF) for ACOs and QA, belong to the CRF 
function.  
• Support to Contingency Operations and CONUS disasters, such as 
Operation WARPSPEED in development of a COVID vaccine. 
Problem: There is a lack of trained contingency and emergency essential personnel 
in DAFA that can augment and support the military services in contingency situations. 
Research and recommendations: Increase training for the CRF positions and 
possibly increase the number of these positions. Give better incentive pay and partial time 
towards active military service, if the location puts the FTE in harm’s way. Historically 
some areas will still have issues filling the CRF position. 
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2. Additional Resources Needed 
Problem: We do not have adequate support abilities for contingency and 
emergency events. 
Research and recommendations: When contingency events arise, DAFA or the 
DOD could offer such events as training roundtables—training events to support when new 
directives are put out. Vice roundtables, a specific FAQ-type inbox that was actually 
responded to could also help the contracting officers in response to this type of events. This 
FAQ box or roundtable should not just be government specific but also available for the 
contractors in order to limit the questions and research needed by their assigned 
administration office. Adequate training and enough volunteers for this type of effort are 
needed. This effort might be more successful if it was a combined DOD effort once 
operating systems were standardized across agencies. Having enough volunteers for the 
needed workforce such as acquisition and QA along with DOD and other career fields is 
crucial.  
3. Mobile Support 
Problem: Not every geographic area can support an emergency event in their area.  
Research and recommendations: Given the incidents with COVID-19, another 
possible option is that DCMA create a mobile response force. This volunteer force could 
be the driving force behind the contingency response force, especially for CONUS 
operations. DCMA faced several new acceptance facets such as the acceptance of the 
operation WARPSPEED contracts which focused on COVID-19 impacted items. ACOs 
from all over the country are working these acceptance items with the ACOs. To streamline 
this, a voluntary mobile response force along with the QAR specialist could work this type 
of issue and provide a better streamlined group of experts when each individual catastrophe 
appears. 
4. Contingency Response Force 
Problem: The DOD does not have enough individuals to respond to emergency 
and contingency environments with adequate training.  
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Research and recommendations: Develop a permanent contingency response 
force (CRF), much like the one the DOD has with DCMA, where it is voluntary, but the 
newly formed one would be a Contingency Contracting Corps. While we can expect for 
changes to happen with any life-changing event, some options for improvement would be 
a trained contingency response force, whether it be voluntary or by position identification 
number when hired. The training could offer specific courses for this type of atmosphere.  
These courses could possibly give the ACOs a specific contingency contracting 
warrant such as the military services give to their CCOs. The CCO warrant could better 
prepare our deployable ACO positions and have them arrive in theater already having the 
contingency warrant and allowing them to be more “boots on ground” ready to assist. 
Courses should be pandemic/disaster/wartime-specific to give the employees an 
understanding of which guidelines are used in each situation. This training could also be 
offered further than just DCMA. There are several clauses and provisions that are required 
in all contracts that have mission-essential functions; the clause requires the contractors to 
provide a mission-essential service plan. However, without training the ACOs and COs 
will not know what an acceptable plan would be.  
This training could cover that disaster or emergency assistance is FAR Subpart 
26.2, which is different from Contingency Operations, which is FAR 18.201-3. 
Foundations for the training could come from the DOD acquisition guide. This guide 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
Our recommendations show real potential for the Fourth Estate to improve value to 
the military services while also saving the DOD time and money. This could be done by 
merging some existing agencies together, establish some entirely new agencies, closing 
other agencies, and expanding the services rendered by the Fourth Estate altogether.  
If the military departments create better defined service requirements, meaning 
long-term through which the DAFA can develop a cadre of skilled service managers, then 
those service managers can focus on accountability and results by returning future service 
work back to the U.S. government for performance. Retention of government work requires 
a blend of allowing existing service contracts to run their course, as the government fills in 
and trains personnel to become proficient, and redefining the line of governmentally 
inherent work to create a balance that will facilitate the implementation of four of the five 
tenants under the first part of former Secretary of Defense R. Gates’s better buying 
initiative (BBI), target affordability, and control growth. 
1. Mandate affordability as a requirement. 
2. Drive productivity growth through will cost/should cost management. 
3. Eliminate redundancy within warfighter portfolios. 
4. Make production rates economical and hold them stable. 
5. Set shorter program timelines and manage to them. (Carter, 2010) 
Although the spirit of the BBI is competition through industry, there are 
opportunities in which the U.S. government can contract with individuals for labor and 
save on overhead, G&A, and profit that add no benefit to the work requirements. This 
situation will not always be possible, but in areas and in times that it is more beneficial to 
contract with individual professionals as hourly workers (WG), rather than with a company 
or corporation that provides experts, technicians, and specialists, then the government 
should pursue that route. The potential to hire individuals that have proven themselves to 
be worth their wages could then go on to become salaried federal employees (GS), if 
feasible. There will be cases in which the hourly rate that is paid to the individual is so high 
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that the General Schedule cannot cover the rate, and so as a part of negotiations the 
individual is retained as an hourly WG employee indefinitely. 
According to the documents housed at the Defense Procurement and Policy (DPAP) 
website under the ICS, in 2019 the Air Force awarded 47,222 contracts and spent $47.3 
billion on outside services. The Army 84,691—contracts for $57.6 billion. The Navy—80, 
203 for $44.5 billion, and the OSD agencies—56,035 contracts for $40.3 billion, an 
aggregate of 268,151 contracts at a cost of $189.7 billion. The DOD’s total budget in 
FY2019 was $686 billion (Defense, 2018), meaning that outside services consisted of 28% 
of the total defense budget. The other considerations are the number of DOD acquisition 
personnel needed to procure and manage those contracts, not to mention the modifications 
of those contracts in the normal course of administration. The DOD cannot do without 
outside contracted services, but there are portfolio groups, such as knowledge-based 
services (KB) and electronic-related (ER) services (called “IT” here). Services that should 
be reconsidered in that they constitute over half off all the ICS contracts and are a type of 
value that the DOD should retain for a variety of reasons.  
One of the reasons the DOD should reconsider a portion of both portfolio groups is 
the benefit of creating acquisition personnel assets that retain the knowledge accumulated 
over time. Each time that a knowledge-based or IT contract is awarded to an outside 
contractor, the opportunity to create a permanent asset is lost. The DOD should review 
these portfolio groups to decide which subgroups could be retained with in the military 
departments themselves or developed in one or more of the Fourth Estate agencies in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Procurement contracts usually have 3 years or less in 
funding, meaning that each time the current contract is about to expire the program office 
and the procurement office must set about to issue the next solicitation and award. The 
incumbent contractor has some advantage over other offerors, but award is not guaranteed. 
This means that the procurement process must cycle through at least every 3 years. The 
procurement process can be lengthy and time consuming, whereas, if these services were 
retained then the procurement process is eliminated and an effort to train and retain WG 
and GS employees replaces the more cyclical process. 
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It would be a mistake to think that all knowledge-based and IT efforts could be 
converted to in-house work or that all WG and GS employees would stay with the 
government 20 plus years; however, if the average newly on-boarded WG or GS were to 
stay close to 10 years, then, in theory, the procurement cycle is cut from once every 3 years 
to every 10 years. Better yet, the full competition procurement cycle is actually eliminated 
in that a new method of procurement through a more simplified individual hiring process 
would take place.  
Even when the incumbent contractor wins the follow-on contract, the mix of 
employees changes at a faster rate than would happen among government employees, 
especially GS employees, thereby losing knowledge from a shorter employee retention 
span. The retention of knowledge through the retention of employees ensures that the 
required work activities are performed satisfactorily from beginning to end with less time 
committed to the procurement process and training over an extended period of time with 
the added benefit of better asset (personnel) control. Moreover, as outside service contracts 
expire, the government could make offers to those individuals employed by the contractor 
to come work for the government either in a WG or GS position. This way the government 
is able to experience and decide what skills and personalities are desirable before 
committing to employment. 
The next reason to retain services in-house are the potential security risks that can 
occur by using outside services. Utilizing DAFA employees significantly reduce risk of 
spillage of national security secrets versus non-government personnel. There are certain 
service contracts that carry security clearance requirements, but the agency relies on the 
company itself to ensure that its employees adhere to security protocols. These protocols 
put the government just one or more arm’s length from the security source to security 
breach. The vulnerability of hacks into U.S. government networks is heightened, like what 
happened last year through a government contractor, SolarWinds. “U.S. intelligence 
agencies attributed a sophisticated malware campaign to Russia in a massive security 
breach, which reportedly compromised an email system used by senior leadership at the 
Treasury Department and systems at several other federal agencies, starting in March 2020 
when hackers compromised IT management software from SolarWinds (Hautala, 2021).” 
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Also, the possibility of counterfeit parts introduced into government cyber systems 
is increased in IT contracts. It has been reported over the years that the DOD needs to 
expand and submit actionable reporting and oversight to lessen supply chain risk of 
counterfeit parts, but reporting is the fact step, after the damage is already done. As prime 
contractors push down tasks to subcontractors, the possibility of introducing counterfeit 
parts increases making the supply chain more vulnerable to espionage and hacks. 
Contractors need not have direct access to the government’s most sensitive IT systems to 
wreak havoc on them. Even the most dependable, tried and true, IT security systems can 
still have the architecture breached, supply system penetrated, and personnel compromised, 
which in turn puts the government’s systems in a vulnerable position. If the DOD were to 
continue to farm out those IT services to outside contractors that should be brought in-
house, it is suggested that the contracts be arranged so that the contractors are teaching or 
simulating the processes away from the actual systems, thereby, compelling the DOD WG/
GS employees to do the work on the system itself. Break up fully integrated IT contracts 
in order to compartmentalize the amount of information each contractor receives, leaving 
only the government employees with the comprehensive knowledge base. 
Another reason to bring said contracts back into the civilian workforce is because 
DCMA is pushing service contracts back to buying commands. For years, DCMA has 
acquiesced to the acceptance of service contracts into its general workload, even though 
many of the contracts are not within the charter of the agency. Now that DCMA is caught 
short in funding in the recent budget cuts under Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, the 
scramble to return or be reimbursed for many service contracts by the Buying Activities 
(BA) has become an existential pursuit. The return of thousands of service contracts back 
to the BA has caught the military departments flat footed and created ruptures in the 
professional relationships between DCMA Contract Management Offices (CMO) out in 
the field and their customers who now must put together Contract Administration Offices 
(CAO) within their own commands. If only a small fraction of the $189.7 billion 
procurement for outside services were transferred to DCMA to accommodate the 
administration of services and possibly the actual performance of KB services, then the 
$1.4 billion budget that the agency currency enjoys could double or triple, while saving the 
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BAs from developing their own CAO and procuring some KB contracts because DCMA 
could conduct the work. The work activities would have a greater strength of permanency 
and security. According to the official DCMA website, www.dcma.mil, in FY2018, 
“DCMA saved, recovered, or cost avoided $4.83 billion against a $1.4 billion budget. That 
is a 3.46 to 1 return on taxpayer investment” (DCMA, 2019, p. 2).  
The last reason is that the DOD should retain more knowledge-based and IT 
services in-house is mark-up or wrap rate on the actual labor. A wrap rate is the factor 
applied to a base hourly labor rate to arrive at a loaded labor rate—fringe, overhead, G&A, 
and profit. Contractors use this wrap to build their proposal, along with a generous time 
allowance to ensure that a fixed-price contract is lucrative. Every company uses different 
proposal build models becoming quite complex, but the wrap rate is easiest. 
According to the American company, Grant Thornton, a prominent tax auditing 
firm, which the DOD uses, the average wrap rate used by professional services companies 
on government RFP was 2.1 in 2017, 2.1 in 2016, and 2.2 in 2015 (Grant Thornton, 2018). 
This means with all other things being equal and the same approximate rate remains true 
today, for $1 that the government spent on actual labor, it had to spend another $2.10 in 
overhead that only marginally benefits the government. In other words, the DOD spent 
approximately $128.5 billion on overhead as opposed to $61.2 billion in labor on all of its 
service contracts. If the DOD were to use the ICS as the tool by which to make “make or 
buy” decisions, as it was intended, then the outside services contracts could be converted 
into in-house service in a judicious manner that would allow for a huge savings and more 
“bang for the buck” in actual services.  
There will be internal pressure whether to replace outside services with military 
personnel or federal employees to save money from the rollback, and then equally the 
political pressure on Congress to reduce the civilian workforce in the DOD, especially 
when budgets are strained and the military force is downsizing. The discussion should be 
about how to determine the optimal blend of military and civilian FTEs. A cadre of service 
managers (SM) and policy would be necessary to start the ball rolling toward a more robust 
rollback of services and how. The SM would be trained to the same level as program 
managers (PM) and have the authority to hire and fire WG employees until, and unless, 
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converted to GS employees. The SM’s skill set will dictate what portfolio group they will 
manage. Service specialists (SS) will then assist the SM in the day functions that are 
required to confer with customers and employees. 
There are already two agencies within the DOD that could house the future set of 
KB and IT service providers, DISA and DCMA. Both agencies have the skill sets to 
develop SM and SS and could easily “contract” with their DOD customers. Both agencies 
should be given the funding to expand their service portfolios, especially DCMA, to 
include the pre-award processes, management of individuals on work orders, jobs, and 
programs for the military services and stay on top of the ICS to review which outside 
services should be moved in-house and how. Both DISA and DCMA are contracting 
agencies that could convert services and show savings as those services roll back in, both 
in the current budget and future budgets. 
The current COVID-19 environment may be an opportune time to begin the shift 
of outside services to the two agencies. The DOD should for the sake of all military, civilian 
employees, and its Defense Industrial Base (DIB) create one Universal Conferencing 
Platform. Multiple options exist as a base design for universal sharing and conferencing 
platform, such as Defense Collaboration Services, Zoom, Apple FaceTime, MS Teams, 
and Webex; however, the platforms, firewalls, security practices, and software protections 
differ from agency to agency, making it impossible for interagency communication, as well 
as government-to-contractor video communication and data sharing. The DOD must select 
one platform and develop a vertically integrated system that captures all the necessary 
features and implement the security measures to ensure all controlled and classified 
information transmitted stays secure. Contractors should be compelled to meet the 
communication requirements in order to be awarded certain contracts. 
In addition to the challenges with the COVID-19 work environment, it expanded 
the reality for a need of better trained, ready to go with “boots on the ground” contingency 
response force within DCMA and the DAFA. With the improvements and broader 
workforce sharing this response force would be able to blend into any work environment, 
whether it be CONUS or OCONUS. As agencies begin to share work platforms and output 
systems, this force would be beneficial when needed. 
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With a Universal Sharing and Conferencing platform there are many services and 
products that DISA and DCMA could inspect remotely; however, at present, there are no 
FAR/DFARS clauses that compel contractors to implement the video, measuring, and 
connectivity equipment to make this process possible. Then the DARS Council should 
bring language into the DFARS that obligates awardees of contracts of a certain type to 
own and operate the equipment required to allow the contract administrating office to 
perform inspection and acceptance remotely. 
If the DOD brought in-house just 25% of all contracted services, then, over time, 
using the 2.1 wrap rate figure, the reduction of overhead costs would amount to a savings 
of $32.2 billion (Grant Thornton, 2018). If one were to run those same savings year after 
year, the numbers really add up. A deeper dive into the government retirement system 
FERS (Federal Employees Retirement System) and what contract employees are given 
would further promote the argument of a greater need to provide more self-services in the 
DOD. Outside contracting will never go away, nor should it, but the DOD should take 
another look at those services that should be returned back to the DOD to decrease security 
risk, build assets within department, and save money on unnecessary overhead. 
A. FUTURE WORK RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our research is based on theoreticals that must be proven out in order to 
demonstrate the possible savings and efficiencies that are laid out herein. Future work 
should be done by implementing the recommendations in a methodical and judicious 
manner. Standards of outcomes should be set, and then, once implemented, compare 
savings and efficiencies. If the expected does not materialize, do not continue the 
experiment and return to previous pre-experiment position. Forming new agencies and 
merging others will be enduring in nature; however, the expansion of DAFA services 
would not be—they would be more flexible. Finding the right mix of contracted out 
services versus the retention and return of others back to the government is what should be 
studied. The private labor talent pool, coupled with career government employees, led by 
a new cadre of service managers will determine the right combination with each and every 
situation. 
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